At a public hearing held on July 13, 1999, the Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents (PSOB) requested that the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) report on the current status (including preliminary findings and conclusions reached to date) of on-going investigations, including the Retrograde Equipment investigation. The purpose of this request was to determine whether the available data and information supported a decision for the continuation of the investigation at hand. The PSOB wanted to know whether continued work would eventually lead to identifying a cause and effect relationship between retrograde equipment and the unexplained illnesses in Gulf War veterans.

In response to the PSOB, OSAGWI provided a summary of the preliminary findings of all work in progress at a public hearing on Sept. 16, 1999. Based on its review of this material, the Board concluded that the information obtained to date on retrograde equipment operations did not support a cause and effect relationship, and that emerging results and anticipated outcomes are not likely to improve our understanding of any of the unexplained illnesses. Consequently, the PSOB recommended that further activities be curtailed and the Retrograde Equipment investigation terminated. To bring the investigation to closure, however, the board requested that OSAGWI complete a close-out report and present the data, documentary evidence, personal accounts obtained during interviews, and trip reports prepared during the course of the investigation. The following sections of this report provide such an accounting.

Following the cessation of hostilities between U.S.-led Coalition forces and the Republic of Iraq, U.S. military units began preparing their equipment and vehicles for redeployment back to their respective peacetime bases and installations. These "retrograde" operations saw a massive number of vehicles and huge quantities of equipment pulled back from their forward locations and assembled at sites where they could be cleaned and processed following strict protocols for materials about to enter US air and sea ports. Cleaning protocols were necessary to prevent the spread of endemic disease, and to protect the United State’s agricultural resources from the international spread of plant and animal pests and diseases.

Some military and civilian personnel who received or helped clean and process the retrograde equipment and vehicles have expressed concerns that these activities may have exposed them to various contaminants found on the battlefield or in the general environment of the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO) and may have resulted in some adverse health effect.

The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether there is any causal relationship between the equipment and vehicles returning from the Gulf and the unexplained adverse health effects reported by civilian and military personnel who have come in contact with the materials. Like other environmental and occupational investigations conducted by this office (i.e., Depleted Uranium and Oil Well Fires), research in this case focused on the principal elements of human exposure to contaminants. These elements were characterized by the following questions:

• What were the contaminants to which U.S. personnel were exposed? Answering this question not only involves identifying the contaminants of concern and their source(s), but also qualitatively and quantitatively confirming their presence through sampling and monitoring activities;
• What was the extent to which U.S. personnel were exposed? Once the presence of contamination is confirmed through sampling, a determination as to whether individuals actually came into contact with contaminated materials is required;
• What are the health effects or symptoms associated with these exposures? Other than self-reports of symptoms, did the medical community make any diagnoses? The presence or absence of this information will be a major factor in determining whether a causal relationship exists.

The impetus for this investigation was a congressional inquiry into incidents reported at the Alameda Naval Air Station and self-reports by a number of veterans who allege adverse health effects resulting from contact with retrograde equipment while in theater.

It should be noted that this investigation was purposefully limited to vehicles and major equipment items only and did not include issues relating to suspected contaminants on uniforms, personal effects, and other equipment items brought back by veterans.

Both military personnel who deployed to the KTO and military and civilian personnel who did not deploy, but were involved in processing equipment returned to the United States, have reported a wide-range of undiagnosed symptoms that include: nosebleeds, skin rashes, headaches, fatigue, respiratory distress, memory loss, sinus and vision problems, and joint pain.[2]

The major activities completed on this investigation include:

• telephone interviews and information exchange with several hundred veterans and civilian employees who were involved in cleaning retrograde equipment and vehicles;
• literature and database searches to retrieve relevant information;
• site visits to major military retrograde equipment and vehicle processing centers;
• site visits to equipment manufacturing facilities; and
• investigations into several incidents at various locations in the United States involving civilian employees who reportedly experienced unexplained adverse health effects from handling retrograde equipment.

Subsequent sections of this report will:

• discuss the reasons why this investigation has been selected for close-out;
• discuss the methodology by which the investigation was conducted;
• present the significant findings and conclusions reached as a result of completed activities; and
• present some of the backup or supporting information relevant to the investigation.

The investigation uncovered no substantiated information to support a connection between the processing and/or handling of retrograded materials and the symptoms reported by veterans. To determine whether retrograde equipment and vehicles were a cause of unexplained illnesses in Gulf War veterans, investigators sought to:

1. qualitatively and quantitatively confirm the presence of contamination;
2. verify that exposure to contaminated equipment occurred; and
3. look for evidence that diagnoses by the medical community had been prepared for any of the reported symptoms.

These factors are critical to characterizing exposure and establishing a causal relationship between contamination and adverse health effects.

Results to date do not support a link between exposures and the medical symptoms or adverse health effects being experienced by some veterans, that is, there is no pattern of illness that supports a causal relationship. While a large number of US personnel came into contact with retrograde equipment and vehicles in the KTO, there are no monitoring or sampling data available that would confirm the presence of any contaminants on these materials. Moreover, investigators have not been able to identify the existence of any diagnoses that connect chronic health effects and exposure to retrograded materials. While a number of acute symptoms have been self-reported, the reported symptoms are wide and varied (e.g., skin rashes, memory loss, digestive disorders, joint ache, etc.), and may have arisen as a result of any number of possible medical reasons.

Furthermore, there were no reports of adverse health effects at the major equipment and vehicle processing locations visited by investigators. There were, however, reported incidents involving civilian workers at two sites. These incidents occurred at the Anniston Army Depot in Anniston Alabama and Camp Robinson in Arkansas (see TAB F). The Anniston incident involved workers exposed to the chromium contained in the chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) filters of M1A1 tanks. In this case shop workers developed a number of symptoms, primarily rashes, after coming in contact with the filters. The filters were tested for radiological and chemical parameters and found to be negative. A high chromium content was detected, however, as chromium is a component of the filter media. The Camp Robinson incident involved shop workers who complained of similar symptoms after working on retrograde equipment. Symptoms were short-term (i.e., none of the shop workers interviewed during this investigation are currently suffering from any of the symptoms initially reported) and were attributed to work-place conditions and not the equipment on which they were working.[3]

Additionally, site visits to equipment manufacturers suggest that there was nothing in the manufacturing process (e.g., chemical components or additives) of specific equipment items that could lead to the onset of symptoms.

Finally, results to date regarding exposure incidents at sites within the United States are inconclusive and in some cases conflicting. The health symptoms reported across and within the sites often varied. With the noted exception of Camp Robinson (TAB F)[4], no clear pattern exists among individuals with common exposure scenarios or symptoms, and individual recollections of possible exposure scenarios are often incomplete and vary among individuals at a given location.

The Presidential Special Oversight Board concluded it was unlikely that additional research into incidents at these or other locations would lead to any new data or a different interpretation of the existing data, and therefore directed the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses to curtail further research in this case.

Before any item of equipment could be re-deployed to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulations required that it undergo a rigorous cleaning and inspection to prevent the transport of undesirable pests and microorganisms back to a unit’s home station. All vehicles and equipment had to be thoroughly cleaned before being loaded on board ships or aircraft. This required service members to take apart (as much as possible) and carefully wash each vehicle and piece of equipment.

Information received from a number of sources, including anecdotal information from Gulf War veterans, indicated that the equipment washing operations presented a significant potential for concentrating contaminants at these locations. Troops working in and around these areas might be expected to be more likely to come in contact with contaminants (if present) and/or receive a higher exposure than troops not engaged in such work. If these exposures were sufficiently high to cause acute health effects, it logically follows that some symptoms would manifest themselves at or in the vicinity of the site where the exposure occurred.

To assess the potential for the onset of adverse health effects from retrograde operations, investigators sought the answers to a number of questions, including:

• What regulations controlled the environmental health and safety aspects of cleaning operations during the redeployment of equipment? What specific regulations or guidance applied? Were USDA inspections and U.S. Customs inspections conducted? Armed Forces Pest Management Board regulations? Policy, guidelines, and U.S. Department of Defense redeployment procedures?
• What procedures did personnel actually use to clean and process returning equipment? How does what actually occurred compare to what was dictated by DOD policy and guidelines?
• Where were the major equipment collection and cleaning points located? What general activities involving this equipment took place at these locations?
• What units were assigned to these locations? Did they exhibit any symptoms during or shortly after conducting retrograde operations? If so, what were the reported symptoms?
• What cleansing agents and wastes were associated with cleaning operations? Are sampling and monitoring data available that might help characterize the contaminants in the wash water waste stream?
• What precautions, if any, did cleaning personnel take to limit exposure to contaminants that may have been present?
• Did anyone collect environmental samples to characterize and confirm suspected contamination on vehicles and equipment?
• What were the properties and characteristics of the suspected contaminants?

Investigators used several resources to resolve these questions, including:

TAB B is a bibliography of reference documents used in this investigation. Table 1 presents a list of resources which investigators accessed to identify and obtain the required information. TAB C contains selected information which investigators gathered from the interviews they conducted with Gulf War veterans.[5] Conclusions and results reached to date on the investigation are presented in the Significant Findings section (Section V) of this report.

Table 1. Database Resources

Investigators also wanted to determine whether personnel at US military bases in the United States (where retrograde type operations are ongoing) were experiencing symptoms similar to those reported by veterans who were involved in equipment and vehicle maintenance and washing while in-theater. It is reasonable to assume that if exposure to equipment and vehicles in the KTO produced symptoms, then individuals should have reported similar symptoms with similar exposures at sites in the United States. Site visits (some of which were completed) to a number of facilities were planned prior to the decision to close-out this investigation (Table 2).

Table 2. Military Facilities Selected for Site Visits

Investigators selected these sites based on the following criteria:

• the sites were representative of both the Army and Marine Corps;
• they represent facilities where major equipment and vehicle maintenance activities were conducted;
• they received potentially "dirty" equipment and vehicles, and could therefore exhibit exposures similar to those exposures received by veterans in-theater; and
• a reported exposure incident may have occurred at the site—i.e., an unexplained adverse health effect or symptom may have been reported as a result of contact with retrograded equipment.

Reports summarizing the trips to those sites where a visit was completed can be found in TAB E.

Investigators have received a number of anecdotal reports of short-term adverse health effects (primarily skin rashes) associated with exposures to tenting, camouflage netting, and sleeping bags. Some theories suggest an association between the symptoms and an exposure to possible off gassing and/or the toxic by-products of the breakdown of the chemical components. The purpose of this phase of the investigation was to determine the chemical composition of the additives, pigments, dyes, and preservatives used in the manufacturing of these items, and to determine whether these chemicals could possibly cause the reported symptoms. Site visits, some of which were completed, were planned to a number of manufacturing facilities before the decision to close-out this investigation (Table 3). Investigators did not conduct an examination of the use, management, and disposal of oil, greases, solvents and other fluids associated with vehicle operation and maintenance. While some of these materials are known to be toxic or represent health hazards, investigators determined them to be outside the scope of this investigation.

Table 3. Manufacturing Facilities Selected for Site Visits

TAB E contains the reports summarizing the trips to those manufacturing sites where a site visit was completed by investigators.

Investigators sought to determine whether an association existed between the symptoms reported and any contamination that may have been present at specific facilities and locations where civilian and military personnel came in contact with retrograde materials. Congressional inquires and media reports identified several sites, which became candidates for investigation. Where possible, investigators interviewed the individuals involved and requested supporting information and documentation when available. Site visits, while considered, have not been made to these locations. These incidents almost exclusively involved non-deployed DOD and contractor civilians rather than Gulf War veterans. Table 4 lists the locations where personnel have alleged that exposure incidents occurred. This part of the overall investigation is incomplete.

Table 4. Site-specific Incidents

TAB F contains preliminary write-ups on the four incidents where an investigation has been initiated.

• Military personnel conducted major retrograde equipment and vehicle washing operations at primary and secondary airports and seaports of debarkation.[7] The two initial primary airports of debarkation were located at Dhahran and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the US expanded the airlift operation to other Saudi airports, principally King Fahd and King Khalid. The two principal seaports were Al Jubayl and Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates provided ports for other in-theater operations—moving pre-positioned stocks and providing storage. Before final processing at the primary ports of debarkation, military personnel sometimes performed preliminary equipment and vehicle-cleaning activities at various tactical assembly areas located in-theater.
• There were as many as 50 wash stations (racks) at each of the primary airports and seaports of debarkation. One estimate put the total number of wash points in Saudi Arabia at 782.[8] Personnel performing the washing operations typically allowed runoff and waste containing discharges to percolate into the soil or flow down storm drains which discharged into the Persian Gulf.[9]
• There were reports that personnel used non-potable well water and recycled water or industrial, non-potable (gray) water at some washing stations at King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Al Jubayl, Hafar Al Batin, and Dhahran.[10] Toxic or hazardous contaminants, if present, could have accumulated over time at these wash stations and nearby US personnel could have been exposed to them. No evidence of environmental monitoring and sampling at these or other locations exists. Interviews with military personnel knowledgeable in this subject suggest that environmental monitoring and sampling was, in general, not conducted.[11,12,13,14] Consequently, a full assessment of the exposure and resulting risk to human health cannot be made. Similarly, sampling data on contaminant levels on retrograded equipment and vehicles at locations within the United States are either not available or were negative for the parameters analyzed.[15]
• Each unit was responsible for cleaning its own vehicles and equipment before redeployment. Each vehicle required two to three individuals (or about 24-man hours) to complete the cleaning.[16,17]The Army alone washed more than 2,000 vehicles per day. In the first 120 days of redeployment, military personnel cleaned more than 117,000 wheeled vehicles, 12,000 tracked vehicles, and 2,000 helicopters, and also packed 41,000 containers of supplies.[18] Assuming the average soldier spent about 30 days[19] cleaning vehicles and equipment, the data suggests that more than 20,000 soldiers may have been involved in the washing and packaging operations conducted in-theater.[20]
• Despite the large numbers of troops involved in retrograde operations, a relatively small proportion attribute their symptoms to their retrograde activities. For example, of the 225 veterans interviewed,[21] the vast majority believes that their current medical condition is not related to their retrograde activities. For those who reported an adverse health effect, the occurrence of rashes was the most commonly reported symptom. This occurred in about 20% of the self-reports. Fatigue, joint pain, headaches, and memory loss each accounted for about 10%. The remainder (~40%) was roughly equally divided between all other reported symptoms.
• While U.S. forces generally complied with the rigid U..S Military Pest Management Board and U.S. Department of Agriculture protocols governing the cleanliness of returning equipment and vehicles, information collected during this investigation suggests that on occasion, retrograded items were not cleaned to standards.[22] This information suggests that personnel processing these materials at locations outside of the KTO would have been exposed to the same contaminants (if present) as those involved in cleaning operations in the KTO. There have been, however, no reports by military personnel of any adverse health effects attributable to contact with retrograde materials at any of the major equipment and vehicle processing installations visited by investigators.
• Based on veteran interviews regarding exposure incidents and activities at retrograde processing sites in the Kuwait theater of operations investigators have determined that a clustering of symptoms,[23] events, and/or exposure scenarios is not apparent. In addition, the symptoms that have been reported by the veterans have not been verified through medical evaluations. Furthermore, very little documentation or data exists that would either support or refute any of the exposure claims at these locations. Therefore, it is impossible to verify that contamination was present and that the contamination resulted in exposure and the onset of adverse health effects.
• Some veterans speculated that the application of fumigants, preservatives, or other forms of pesticides to shipping containers might have lead to inadvertent exposure to toxic or hazardous chemicals contained in these compounds. Investigators have found no evidence of this practice. Guidance on operational washdowns and cleaning procedures for all branches of the military service are contained in the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Technical Information Memorandum No. 31.[24] This guidance does not include provisions for applying fumigants and pesticides to shipping containers. Interviews with personnel at the USMC Blount Island Command indicate that the application of pesticides to shipping containers is not standard practice within the USMC Maritime Prepositioned Ships program.[25]
• Washing operations typically involved the use of high-pressure water and in some instances cleaning agents (e.g., there were anecdotal reports of cleaning agents being used during aircraft washing operations) such as PD680, Decontaminating Solution No. 2 (DS2, an ammonia-based detergent) and super tropical bleach (STB).[26] By some accounts, cleaning personnel also used commercially available solvents and cleaning agents.[27] Short-term symptoms associated with the inhalation of DS2 include nausea, vomiting, and respiratory tract irritation.[28] Dermal contact may result in burns. STB is a bleaching agent containing calcium hypochlorite (a powerful oxidizer) and calcium oxide (a corrosive material). STB is corrosive to the skin and eyes and extremely destructive to tissues of the mucous membranes and upper respiratory tract.[29]
• Anniston Army Depot was one of two locations where civilian workers reported similar symptoms after coming in contact with retrograde equipment. This incident involved shop workers who worked on chemical-biological-radiological filters from retrograded M1A1 tanks.[30] Workers developed a number of symptoms, primarily rashes, after coming in contact with the filters. The filters were tested for radiological and chemical parameters and found to be negative. A high chromium content was detected, however, as chromium is used in the filter media. In sensitive individuals, chromium has been known to cause contact dermatitis and therefore may explain the rashes reported by some individuals. [31]
• The second incident involving similar reported symptoms occurred at Camp Robinson. As many as 13 shop workers reported similar short-term symptoms that included headaches, nausea, nose bleeds, joint pain, and some eye irritations. The symptoms were physician diagnosed as arising from workplace conditions and not related to contact with retrograde equipment.[32] None of the shop workers who were interviewed as part of this investigation reported that they are currently experiencing any symptoms.[33] Samples of sand were taken from potentially contaminated vehicles and were analyzed for chemical and biological agents. The analytical results were negative for all parameters tested. [34]
• Evidence collected to date indicates that there have been no diagnoses of any chronic illnesses associated with exposures to retrograded equipment, both in the KTO and locations within the US. The short-term symptoms most commonly reported by military and civilian personnel were joint pain and skin rashes.
• Materials and information obtained to date from equipment manufacturers provide no evidence to support a connection between reported symptoms and chemicals contained in tenting, netting, and sleeping bags.[35] However, some chemicals contained in these items can, in sufficient dosages, cause health effects. For example, chromium, commonly used in tent pigments before 1993, may cause contact dermatitis in sensitive individuals.[36]
• The results to date into exposure incidents at sites within the United States (Table 4) are thus far incomplete. With the exception of the Camp Robinson case, the health symptoms reported across and within each of the sites varied. In general, however, clustering of symptoms, events, and/or exposure scenarios is not apparent.
•  Environmental samples of various media (e.g., sand, filters, and surfaces) have been taken at four site-specific locations where potential exposures had been reported; these included: USMC Logistics Base - Albany, Alameda Naval Air Station, Anniston Army Depot, and Camp Robinson. Analyses of the samples for radiological contaminants, chemical agents, and biological agents proved negative.[37,38,39]

AAD       Anniston Army Depot

AAV       amphibious assault vehicle

BUMED  U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine

CBR        chemical, biological, radiological filters

CCEP      Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program

CIA         Central Intelligence Agency

DIA        Defense Intelligence Agency

DLA        Defense Logistics Agency

DOD       U.S. Department of Defense

DS2        Decontaminating Solution No. 2

KKMC    King Khalid Military City

KTO        Kuwait theater of operations

NAS       naval air station

OSAGWI         Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

OTSG     Office of the Surgeon General

PGIIT     Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team

PD680   Hydrocarbon (mineral spirits) degreasing solvent

POC       point of contact

PVC        polyvinylchloride

PSOB     Presidential Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations Of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents

SCI          special compartmentalized information

STB         super tropical bleach

USAMRIID           U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

USCENTCOM     U.S. Central Command

USDA    U.S. Department of Agriculture

"22nd Support Command After Action Report," Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office – Saudi Arabia, April 1991.

"22nd SUP COM AAR The Final Chapter XII, ARCENT, After Action Review, Executive Summary," US Army Central Command.

"1997 Hazardous Waste Report," Technical Products Group, Inc., Deland, FL, February 1998.

"Agriculture Risk Assessment For Persian Gulf Region," US Army Central Command, March 20, 1991.

Brown, Ronald J., "Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991, WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1995.

Graniteville Company, "Laboratory Report: QLL-8550", Graniteville Company, Woodhead Division, Graniteville, S.C., October 1995.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, DAMA-ODO-AOC message, Subject: "Army Requirements for Captured Iraqi Equipment," March 1991.

Lead Sheets:

• Lead Sheet 881, Synopsis’ 3&4, Interview of civilian doctor and maintenance shop worker, July 23, 1996.
• Lead Sheet 7747, Interview of Gulf War veteran, May 13, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 7810, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 29, 1998.>
• Lead Sheet 8150, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 30, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 8294, Interview of DOD civilian, Dec. 2, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 8326, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 8367, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 29, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 8392, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 7, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 8442, Interview of civilian contractor – Camp Robinson, Dec. 18, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 8443, Interview of DOD civilian, March 12, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 8447, Interview of civilian contractor – Camp Robinson, Dec. 18, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 8977, Interview of civilian contractor - Anniston, Oct. 31, 1996.
• Lead Sheet 8980, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Oct. 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9244, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 9, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9308, Interview of non-deployed Veteran, Sept. 30, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9340, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 8, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9368, Interview of DOD civilian, Oct. 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9369, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 28, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9394, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9410, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 13, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9430, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9457, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Oct. 5, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9461, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 11, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 9584, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Nov. 19, 1996.
• Lead Sheet 9595, Interview of E-7 Intelligence Analyst, Sept. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9734, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9754, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 5, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9799, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 9801, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 9889, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10131, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 6, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10222, Interview of DOD civilian – Fort Bragg, March 9, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10315, Interview of DOD civilian, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10349, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 6, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10353, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 24, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10400, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 3, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10437, Interview of deployed DOD civilian, Sept. 30, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10458, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10535, Interview of non-deployed veteran, March 10, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10667, Interview of non-deployed DOD civilian, Oct. 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 10747, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 4, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 10959, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 11918, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 12118, Interview of the Command Sergeant Major for the 1103rd Transportation Battalion, Sept. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 12398, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 17, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 12442, Interview of non-deployed DOD civilian, Dec. 1, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 12479, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 14, 1998
• .Lead Sheet 12738, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 12784, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 18, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 12857, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 29, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 12888, Interview of deployed DOD civilian, Sept. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13014, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Oct. 27, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13172, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13209, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 7, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 13217, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Feb. 3, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13384, Interview of non-deployed veteran – Camp Roberts, Dec. 4, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 13391, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13786, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 8, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 13832, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 12, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 13863, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct.1, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13865, Interview of Gulf War veteran, De. 17, 1997.
• Lead Sheet 13870, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13883, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 13893, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept.22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 14153, Interview of non-deployed veteran, Jan. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 14235, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Camp Roberts, Jan. 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 14275, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 21, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 14308, Interview of non-deployed veteran, July 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 14391, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 29, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15362, Interview of non-deployed military doctor - Alameda, March 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15496, Interview of Civilian Nurse – Alameda, March 18, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15604, Interview of DoD Civilian – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), March 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15638, Interview of naval investigator – Alameda, March 30, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15685, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 15813, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 21, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16048, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16418, Interview of contractor responsible for unloading fleet hospital ships, May 8, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16420, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Alameda, April 26, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 16828, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16829, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16834, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16851, Interview of non-deployed civilian contractor – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16854, Interview of civilian nurse – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 27, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 16892, Interview of DOD civilian – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), May 29, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17227, Interview of non-deployed veteran, June 12, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17230, Interview of DOD civilian – Anniston Army Depot, June 12, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17282, Interview of Gulf War veteran, October 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17300, Interview of DOD civilian – Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), June 17, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17370, Interview of DOD civilian – Anniston Army Depot, June 18, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17389, Interview of deployed DOD civilian, June 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17391, Interview of DOD civilian, Oct. 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17415, Interview of wife of deployed DoD civilian, June 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17418, Interview of DOD civilian, June 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17420, Interview of DOD civilian –  Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg), June 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17432, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 18, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17433, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17434, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17442, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17461, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17563, Interview of Gulf War veteran, June 29, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17609, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17612, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17655, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 17658, Interview of deployed DOD civilian, March 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 17700, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17707, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17796, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17814, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17824, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 8, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 17829, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 7, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17837, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 12, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17889, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17896, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17900, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 27, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17906, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 21, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17908, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17909, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 4, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17911, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 5, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17913, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 26, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17914, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 5, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17917, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 4, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 17921, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 4, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18041, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 4, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18043, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18061, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18064, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18112, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18114, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18130, Interview with spouse of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 16, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18157, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 18158, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18217, Interview with spouse of customs inspector, Aug. 18, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18233, Interview of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18235, Interview of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18255, Interview of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18256, Interview of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18258, Interview of DOD civilian at the Anniston Army Depot, July 22, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18293, Interview of physician treating DOD civilians from Anniston Army Depot, July 24, 1998
• Lead Sheet 18522, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18599, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 8, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18758, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18803, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 18894, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19065, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 13, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19096, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19143, Interview of Operations Officer for the 593rd Area Support Group, Sept. 21, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19171, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 21, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19221, Interview of DOD civilian industrial hygienist, Oct. 1, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19231, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 28, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19255, Interview of UH/AH-1 pilot and safety officer, Sept. 28, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19282, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct.10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19285, Interview with spouse of Gulf War veteran, Sept. 30, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19334, Interview of the Commanding Officer 593rd Support Group, Oct. 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19346, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 3, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19349, Interview of Staff Sergeant Mechanic attached to the NY Army National Guard 145th Maintenance Company, Oct. 6, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19381, Interview with DOD civilian, Oct. 12, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19435, Interview of civilian lab chemist, Oct. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19440, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19441, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19442, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19446, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19471, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19473, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19481, Interview of DOD civilian maintenance technician, Oct. 16, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19503, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 15, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19513, Interview of civilian mechanic, October 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19585, Interview of Officer in Charge of Preventive Medicine, Nov. 4, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19590, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 5, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19609, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19723, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 17, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19728, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 6, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19734, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 1, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19736, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 2, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19759, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 1, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 19760, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 5, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19843, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Oct. 28, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 19887, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 7, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20012, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 5, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20104, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb.15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20105, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20109, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20139, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 13, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20150, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 7, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20162, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20163, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20167, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20169, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 8, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20233, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 3, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20236, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20237, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 3, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20246, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 12, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20249, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 4, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20259, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 4, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20266, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 8, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20267, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20268, Interview of Officer in Charge of washdown operations, Nov. 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20286, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 17, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20323, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 19, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20335, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 20, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20346, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 10, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20360, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 23, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20371, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20374, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 3, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20400, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Nov. 24, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20401, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 3, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20412, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20414, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20417, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 17, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20419, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 8, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20465, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 20650, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 8, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20719, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec.11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20721, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 11, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20724, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Dec. 14, 1998.
• Lead Sheet 20989, Interview of civilian contractor – Alameda, Jan. 7, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21003, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 7, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21006, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 8, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21027, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 11, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21034, Interview of civilian contractor – Alameda, Jan. 26, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21068, Interview of civilian contractor – Alameda, Jan. 13, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21078, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 13, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21098, Interview of civilian contractor – Alameda, Jan. 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21195, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21240, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 1, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21276, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan.27, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21341, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 1, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21430, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21452, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21517, Interview of UH/AH-1 helicopter mechanic, March 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21530, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 4, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21535, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 5, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21592, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21665, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 16, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21666, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 17, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21681, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 17, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21697, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21701, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21704, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 12, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21755, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21757, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21758, Interview of CH-46 helicopter mechanic, March 25, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21760, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 29, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21765, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21794, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21797, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21799, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 24, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21808, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 3, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21810, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21811, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 25, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21812, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21814, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 24, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21815, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 18, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21839, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21849, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21890, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21953, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb.26, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21962, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 26, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21965, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Feb. 26, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 21995, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 1, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22011, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22014, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22021, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 1, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22024, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 1, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22151, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 10, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22167, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Jan. 12, 2000.
• Lead Sheet 22261, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 22, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22281, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 23, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22343, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 29, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22354, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 29, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22366, Interview of Gulf War veteran, March 29, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22606, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 27, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22673, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 20, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22716, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 2, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22798, Interview of Gulf War veteran, May 28, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 22858, Interview of Gulf War veteran, April 29, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 23116, Interview of Gulf War veteran, May 4, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 23349, Interview of Gulf War veteran, May 13, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 23956, Interview of an Auto Maintenance Technician, July 15, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 24115, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 21, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 24209, Interview of Gulf War veteran, July 9, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 24739, Interview of Gulf War veteran, Aug. 25, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 25993, Interview of Chief Union Steward at USMC Logistics Base – Albany Georgia, March 30, 1999.
• Lead Sheet 26011, Interview of OIC Ground Support Management at USMC Blount Island Command, April 13, 1999.

Letter (draft) from Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, to the Honorable Sam Nunn, Unites States Senator, Subject: Summary of findings regarding rashes experienced by some base personnel, July 15, 1994.

Letter from Deputy Assistant Chief for Operation Medicine and Fleet Support, Department of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, to Senior Staff Assistant to the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, U.S. House of Representatives, Subject: Medical problems experienced by DYNCORP employees, Feb. 20, 1998.

Letter from the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, U.S. House of Representatives, to Commanding Officer, Fleet Hospital Support Office, Department of the Navy, Subject: Request for information on medical problems experienced by DYNCORP employees, Dec. 18, 1997.

Letter from Medical Physician, Ear, Nose and Throat Associates of Gadsden, P.A. Gadsden, Alabama, to Commanding Officer, Anniston Army Depot, Subject: Request for analysis of CBR filters, Oct. 19, 1993.

Letter from Medical Physician, Ear, Nose and Throat Associates of Gadsden, P.A. Gadsden, Alabama, to Senator Richard Shelby, US Senate, Subject: Request for analysis of CBR filters, Nov. 4, 1993.

Letter (draft) from the Office of the Surgeon General, to Senator Richard Shelby, US Senate, Subject: Response to request for information regarding medical issues and filter testing at AAD, (no date).

Letter from Senator Richard Shelby, U.S. Senator, to Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, Subject: Request for information regarding medical problems and CBR filter testing at Anniston Army Depot, Nov. 22, 1993.

"Material Safety Data Sheet – Temper Tent," Avondale Mills, Inc., Graniteville, S.C.

McGrath, J.J., and M.D. Krause, "Theater Logistics and the Gulf War", US Army Materiel Command, 1994.Memorandum from Chief, Diagnostic Systems Division, USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, to Director, Health Services, US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Leonard Wood, Subject: "Request for Biological, Chemical Analysis," Oct. 31, 1996.

Memorandum from Commander, US Army Medical Materiel Development Activity, Fort Detrick, to Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans Illnesses Investigation Team, Subject: "Request for Information," Feb. 22, 1996.

Memorandum from Command Surgeon, U.S. Army Materiel Command to Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Subject: "Claims of Gulf War Syndrome from AMC Depot Employees Maintaining Material Returned from the Persian Gulf Theatre," May 4, 1994.

Memorandum from Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses Investigation Team, to U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, Fort Detrick, Subject: "Request for Information," Dec. 17, 1995.

Memorandum from Director, Professional Services, Department of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General, to HQDA, Subject: "Congressional Inquiry Re Medical Issues," Dec. 21, 1993.

Memorandum from Occupational Health Nurse, Naval Hospital Jacksonville Branch Medical Clinic Occupational Health, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, to Repair Division Safety, Subject: "Skin Rashes," July 1994.

Memorandum from Persian Gulf Veterans Illnesses Investigation Team, to US Army Medical research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Diagnostic Systems Division, Subject: "Sand Samples relating to Gulf War Illnesses," Aug. 19, 1996.

Memorandum from Principal Director, Storage and Distribution Directorate, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, to Principal Director, Maintenance Directorate and Director, Repair Division, Subject: "Chemical and Biological Test Results, Repair Division," July 1994.

Memorandum from Safety Director, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama, to Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command and Commander, U.. Army Material Command, Subject: "Filters from M1 Series Tanks Returned from Operation Desert Storm," Feb. 22, 1994.

Military Specification, "MIL-C-41103C – Cloth, Duck, Polyester, Fire, Water and Weather Resistant," U.S. Army Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center (GL), Natick, MA., July 1998.

Military Specification, "MIL-C-53004B – Camouflage Screening Systems, Modular, Lightweight, Synthetic, Woodland, Desert and Snow," Naval Publications and Forms Center, Philadelphia, PA, August 1985.

"Operational Plan 91-4 (Redeployment), Appendix 4 to Annex C – Disposition of Excess, Unserviceable, or Non-DOD Material," U.S. Army Central Supply Command – Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, March 1991."Operational Plan 91-8 Prepositioning and Retrograde Plan," US Army Central Supply Command – Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, July 1991.

"Operational Plan 416E-0005 – Operations to Redeploy ENCOM Units from Saudi Arabia," U.S. Army Central Command, 416th Engineer Command – Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 1991.

Pagonis, W.P. and J.L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass., 1992.

"Preventive Medicine Augmentation Team After Action Report, Final Report: Illness And Injury Among U.S. Marines During Operation Desert Storm," Jan. 18, 1993.

Quilter, Charles J., "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force In Desert Shield and Desert Storm," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993.

"Technical Information Memorandum No. 31 – Contingency Retrograde Washdowns: Cleaning and Inspection Procedures," U.S. Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, December 1993.

U.S. Army, Anniston Army Depot memorandum, Subject: "Filters from M1 Series Tanks Returned from Operation Desert Storm," Feb. 22, 1994.

"U.S. Army Support Group Forward Packaging Operations in the Persian Gulf," U.S. Army Armament Munitions Chemical Command, September 1992.

U.S. Army Central Command, 22nd Support Command – Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, memorandum, Subject: "22nd Support Command Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Summary of Key Statistics," June 1991.

"USCENTCOM Logistics Planning Guidance For Redeployment (U), Base Communications Center 390 COSQ/DONA," US Army Central Command, March 23, 1991.

Note: For privacy reasons, service member names have not been included in the tables below.

KTO

Europe

Miscellaneous

Notes:

• NA - Data not available
• INCOMP - Interview is incomplete. Veteran was identified with having contact with retrograde equipment but information related to issues on the questionnaire had not been obtained.

1. Date assigned to duties involving retrograde equipment?
2. Length of time involved with these duties? Or duration of exposure?
3. Describe process. For example, wash rack operation, inspections, loading/unloading equipment, packaging, etc. Provide enough detail to allow for a complete and accurate description of the operation.
4. What chemicals or cleaning agents were used, if any, in the process? Quantities? How and where were they stored?
5. What wastes were generated? How and where were they stored? Disposed?
6. Describe any personal exposure you may have had with this material.
7. Number of people typically involved in the operation?
8. What if any symptoms were experienced? When did they first appear?
9. Others who may have experienced similar symptoms?
10. Types of equipment cleaned?
11. Personal protective equipment used?
12. Any unusual or unique events or incidents associated with duties involving retrograde equipment?

Avondale Mills, Inc.

When: March 23, 1999

Representatives:

• Manager, Environmental Engineering
• Technical Manager

Summary Information:

• Avondale coats the polyester fabric used in the GP Large and other tents. They essentially "paint fabric" with preservatives. The fabric is acquired from a 3^rd party.
• Very little change in formulation of coating since patent in 1977. Any change in formulation is sent to Army.
• Product does not have a mildecide, because the polyester is inherently mildew resistant.
• General formula: Polyvinylchloride (PVC) polymer, plasticizer (for flexibility), fillers [Iron Oxide, titanium dioxide, carbon], flame retardants [antimony trioxide], water repellents (wax based), Calcium Carbonate (for added weight), organic solvents [xylene solvent]. Chrome oxide used as a green pigment was discontinued in 1993; a cobalt pigment is now used to impart green color.
• Product is coated and then put through a staged oven for curing. Temperature stages are 150, 250, 350 degrees F. This polymerizes the PVC and liberates the solvent.
• All hazardous wastes are incinerated as part of a supplemental fuel program.
• Temper Tents use an inner lining and floor that Avondale does NOT produce.
• No complaints of health problems from any group of workers, except occasional rash on individuals sewing. This is consistent with abrasive nature of handling large amounts of fabric under arm as one sews it.

Materials Provided:

• Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for the Temper Tent
• Sample of Temper Tent fabric
• Laboratory report for QA testing of product
• Military construction specification number MIL-C-44103C: Cloth, Duck, Polyester, Fire, Water and Weather Resistant

Intellitec

When, March 24, 1999

Representatives:

• Program Manager
• Chemical Engineer
• Safety Manager

Summary Information:

• Named Brunsick Defense during Gulf War.
• Prior to and during Gulf War, camouflage-netting screen was 80-90% of their production.
• During Gulf War, Intellitec had about 40% of total market (the rest was split between two other companies).
• Woodland and sand camouflage-netting screen went to Gulf first because these were in stock. A new netting, Saudi sand color, was produced and sent over during the war.
• Specification for netting is unaltered since 1973.
• No chemical analysis testing of finished product is done, only lot acceptance tests for physical properties (color, etc.).
• Graphite threads are sewn into one version of the camouflage-netting screen to provide radar scattering property.
• A&S Industries (Poplar, MT 59255) makes the netting on which Intellitec puts the camouflage-netting screen.
• Teledyne Brown Engineering (Huntsville, AL) also makes camouflage-netting screen.
• No water repellents or abrasion resistance is added.

Materials Provided:

• 1997 Hazardous Waste Report
• MIL-C-53004B, Camouflage Screening Systems, Modular, Lightweight, Synthetic, Woodland, Desert and Snow
• Notebook of detailed descriptions of chemical components found in the camouflage-netting screen.
• Product brochures

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia, and Defense Logistics Agency

When: March 31 – April 1, 1999

Representatives:

• Head Industrial Hygienist at Occupational Health Dept.
• USMC, Commander, Defense Distribution Depot
• USMC, Deputy Commander, Defense Distribution Depot
• Chief, Operations Office, Defense Distribution Depot

Summary Information:

Depot section

• A mechanic and union steward complains of extreme sensitivity to the sun and itching arms. Associated this with his work on Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) and mineplows that returned from the Gulf. Claims that 78 other individuals from shop have similar problems. A number of these people went over to the dispensary. Said that testing done on equipment 2 years later showed only dirt.
• 2 individuals who sew canvas for the vehicles have had rash problems. This intensified around time when vehicles were returning from the Gulf, but the overall volume of work during this time also increased dramatically. Rashes occurred after lengthy contact with a vinyl coated seat cover material (new).

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) section

• Were told that equipment would return clean and itemized. Reality was that equipment was dirty and in no order. Equipment of all types was shored in any available space in returning vehicles and crates.
• Safety officer recalls only 1 illness during this time period. 2 equipment handlers concurred with this and added that they don’t recall any health complaints.
• DLA would strip down everything off all vehicles and send it to be repaired with a maintenance request.
• Removed most of Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) filters (DLA removes most collateral equipment).
• Equipment returned for almost 2 years, and spent a good deal of time sitting on lots and in warehouses.
• 25-28 equipment handlers (unpackers) touched equipment first and generally wore no gloves.
• Due to exceptionally long work hours, individuals who got sick associated it with over working, and would often go to a private physician.
• A listing of the equipment as it returned would have been very helpful, but none was available.

Dispensary section

• The Industrial Hygienist, in 1994, did some sand sampling and research due to the equipment mechanic’s complaints.
• 4 people (not 78 as claimed by the mechanic) came to the dispensary with complaints similar to the mechanic’s (i.e., rashes). Another 10 had rashes but said they were from known reasons.
• No parasites found in microscopic analysis of sand.
• No health complaints from DLA section.
• Occ. Health Nurse made calls to other bases and could not find any evidence of rashes occurring under similar conditions.
• Physician Assistant at dispensary explained that the mechanic got a severe sunburn while vacationing in Florida because he stayed out in the sun for a long time. This happened the same time as the mechanic complained of health problems associated with the returning equipment. This probably explained the occurrence of the rash.

Materials Provided:

• Results of testing of CBR filters.
• Summary of issues and events brought up at the dispensary regarding Gulf War illnesses.
• Official reply to Senator Sam Nunn regarding mechanic’s complaints.
• RN’s summary report of individuals coming to clinic.
• Current (not available in early 1990’s) SOP for handling suspected contaminated equipment.

Blount Island Command, Florida

When: April 12 – April 14, 1999

Representatives:

• Ground Support Management Branch
• Deputy Director Blount Island Command
• Maintenance Operations Department Head
• Environmental Manager
• Environmental/Occupational and Safety Nurse

Summary Information:

• Marine Prepositioning Force (MPF) formed in 1979.
• 3 squadrons (13 total ships); occupy ports of Guam, Diego Garcia, Mediterranean.
• 30 month rotation to Blount Island for restocking.
• Each ship brings about 1500 pieces of equipment and 350 containers that need to be reconstituted in 30 days. Class 8 medical supplies are among most critical to restock.
• Anything with a shelf life less than 18 months will not be put on a ship.
• Prime contractor is Allied Signal.
• Teamsters and Longshoreman unions both on site.
• All USMC equipment was brought to Al Jubayl for redeployment, with best stuff picked for high priority squadron. Middle tier stuff on second squadron, and worst sent to CONUS for reconstituting. Somalia situation began shortly after the end of the Gulf War.
• All equipment washed in theater by Saudi contractors.
• No preservatives or chemicals used in crates when packing/storing equipment. Lots of sand and dust were brought to Blount Island on equipment.
• Two female workers have had health problems. Not related to retrograde equipment duties. Otherwise, few health complaints regarding the Gulf War.
• Occupational Nurse, who has worked there for 2 � years, hasn’t heard or seen many complaints regarding health problems associated with the Gulf War.
• No environmental sampling done at Blount Island, because no real reason to do so.

Materials Provided:

• Blount Island Command brochure.
• MPF Options for Operation Shining Hope briefing.

Marine Corps Logistic Base, Barstow, California

When: May 18 – May 20, 1999

Representatives:

• Base Commanding Officer
• Base Administrative Officer
• DLA Representatives
• Director – Maintenance Center
• Deputy Director – Maintenance Center
• Business/Process Improvement Manager – Maintenance Center
• Base Industrial Hygienist

Summary Information:

• MCLB Barstow is located on 3 separate sites.
• Current strength: 300 Military, 1814 Civilians
• Many of the civilians are military retirees, and can thus use the military clinic.
• There is a high rate of upper respiratory infections among people in the high desert.
• Some of the operations are unique to Barstow: M198, 155 millimeter Howitzers, SR71 Radar units, etc.
• Barstow’s Fleet Support Center has a large outdoor storage lot for major end items. This is possibly due to the dry climate.
• DLA, Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO), and Maintenance Center on site
• None of the Divisions know of any health problems that their people are facing now or faced during the retrograde equipment return period. Commanders, civilian division chiefs, and Union reps agreed with this statement.
• There were no problems among individuals who removed and repaired powerpacks and CBR filters in M1A1 tanks (an area of concern at other depots).
• 4 civilians from the Maintenance Center were deployed to the KTO. They were given pre- and post-deployment health screening, and showed no health problems.

Materials Provided:

• Marine Corps Multi-Commodity Maintenance Center Briefing package.
• Marine Corps Multi-Commodity Maintenance Center Executive Summary package.
• Marine Corps Multi-Commodity Maintenance Center Standard of Excellence marketing package.

Alameda Naval Air Station - Feb. 12, 1999

I.  Site Location Information

Alameda Naval Air Station is located in California, five miles east of San Francisco, in Alameda. The Air Station is on an island next to Oakland, in San Francisco Bay. The NAS was scheduled to be turned over to the city in 1997.

II.  Case Background

A civilian contractor employed by DYNCORP, worked as a packer for the Navy in Alameda during and after the Gulf War. While unpacking the hospital ships Hope and Mercy, This contractor had an adverse health reaction. She reported that she and other co-workers began to have rashes, stomach problems, bouts of depression, weight loss, and many other health problems. After unsuccessfully attempting to gain benefits from her employer, she wrote a letter on behalf of herself and several other employees to her congressman, Mr. Ronald V. Dellums. Congressman Dellums forwarded her letter, along with a request for an investigation, to the Navy’s Fleet Hospital Support Office.[40] A commander was assigned to investigate the issue. After speaking with the contractor, her supervisor at DYNCORP, the fleet hospital staff, and individuals knowledgeable on retrograde equipment at the CHPPM, the Navy sent a response back to a point of contact in Congressman Dellums' office.[41]

III.  Navy Investigation

After an investigation of the contractor’s claim, the commander of the Navy’s BUMED concluded that any illnesses she contracted were not related to her work unpacking retrograde equipment. There are several main points that led the commander to this conclusion. These points are as follows:

• The Head Project Manager at DYNCORP, indicated that analysis of the tentage material and equipment being handled was performed. Specific attention was given to looking for insects and soil contaminants. Nothing was identified in this effort that could be causing any of the reported symptoms. A records search was conducted to verify this information. Despite an extensive search, the report prepared by the laboratory that performed the analytical work could not be found.
• Following the initial health complaints, employees were instructed to wear long sleeve shirts and forearm length gloves. No further reports of skin irritation were reported after this guidance.
• As of 1993, many of the elements that were part of Fleet Hospital Five were in use in other Fleet Hospitals. There have been no reports of any adverse health affects associated with any Fleet Hospital, or in the packing/unpacking routine.

The commander no longer has the notes from his investigation. However, he recalls speaking with the following individuals:

The civilian contractor.

• The contractor’s supervisor at DYNCORP: He explained that tests had been run on the equipment. He added that he had previous difficulties with her, and that he did not believe she had a strong case here.
• The captain at the Fleet Hospital Support Office: He outlined the procedures that should be followed when packing and unpacking a Fleet Hospital ship.
• Members of the Fleet Hospital ships involved: They felt that proper procedures were followed in the packing and unloading of the ships. They reported no adverse health reactions.
• Individuals knowledgeable about retrograde at CHPPM: They felt that it was unlikely that the retrograde equipment in question could cause the types of health effects this civilian contractor may have experienced.

IV.  OSAGWI Investigation

The OSAGWI analyst began by asking the OSAGWI legislative representative to contact the point of contact at Congressman Dellums' (retired) office. He did and obtained an update of their current position on the Alameda retrograde equipment case. The contractor’s current thoughts on the case were of particular interest since the Navy investigation is now complete. She was satisfied with the results of the Navy investigation, but does want to know the DOD’s official position on the extent to which civilian contractors can receive benefits (e.g. CCEP eligibility).

OSAGWI currently has copies of all the available investigation files from the commander who investigated. Most of these files are memos to and from Congressman Dellums’ office. OSAGWI has also spoken with the following individuals relating to this case:

• The contractor’s supervisor at DYNCORP: He explained that after 3-4 employees had complained of skin itching, DYNCORP had some of the sand and tentage lab tested. Although nothing of note was found in the lab tests, DYNCORP issued forearm length rubber gloves and instructed all workers to wear long sleeved shirts. Following this improvement, no additional complaints were made.
• A co-worker of the contractor: The coworker explained that much of the equipment that was unpacked/repacked was filthy. In some instances, the equipment was even blood stained or harboring small bugs. Several people from her group complained of being bit by insects and were sent to Alameda County Hospital. No changes were made to procedure following this incident. At no time were they given any personal protective equipment, including rubber gloves. This co-worker has had a number of continuing health problems that started about 6 months after she finished her work at Alameda.
• A number of other individuals who worked with at Alameda with this contractor.

V.  Eligibility of Contractors to the CCEP

Civilian contractors are not covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act. For these personnel, injuries and illnesses incurred incident to employment are covered by State workers compensation laws, which establish obligations for employers to provide medical care and compensation. No provision of federal law entitles contractor employees to care in the Military Health System. However, under 10 U.S.C. 1074(c), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments have authority to extend by regulation eligibility for health care services to persons not eligible by statute if such action would further an authorized DOD interest. This is commonly referred to as "Secretarial designee" authority. It is possible that Secretarial designee authority could be used to extend CCEP eligibility to contractor employees, both those who served in theater and those who did not, who believe they have medical problems caused by their Gulf War related employment.

Anniston Army Depot - Feb. 12, 1999

I.  Site Location Information

Anniston Army Depot (AAD) is located in Alabama, 50 miles East of Birmingham, and 10 miles West of the city of Anniston.  The primary mission at Anniston Army Depot is maintenance, overhaul, modification and repair of tracked vehicles, ammunition, and missile systems. Chemical weapons are among the munitions stored here (7.2% of nation's chemical weapons stockpile), mostly M155 rockets shells with sarin, and VX, and mustard, which are stored in some of the hundreds of earthen igloos at Anniston. The Army would like to build an incinerator to dispose of the material, similar to the recently finished chemical agent incinerator at Tooele Depot in Utah.

II.  Case Background

In the summer of 1991, a large amount of retrograde vehicles were sent to Anniston Army Depot to be brought back up to operational standards. In particular, a number of M1A1 tanks from the Gulf War needed maintenance and replacement of worn parts. One part of these tanks that routinely required attention was the chemical, biological, and radiation (CBR) filter system. Tanks were taken into the disassembly area, where the filters were reworked and replaced under controlled conditions.  The filters of 16 vehicles, to include 6 that had been battle damaged, revealed no presence of chemical agents.

Several DOD civilians who worked in the CBR shop began to complain of various health problems in mid- to late-1991. A local physician, who claimed to be several of these individuals, wrote letters to the Commander of AAD and 3 of his congressmen requesting that the issues surrounding the health problems be investigated. Below is a table of the chain of correspondence relating to the physician’s inquiries.

Table 5. Correspondence concerning the physician

III.  OSAGWI Investigation

This office began investigating the issues at Anniston Army Depot after 3 individuals contacted VDM through the 800 line. These individuals all had similar complaints; they all had non-specific symptoms and all worked around retrograde tanks. IAD investigators have followed up with these complaints by contacting two of the individuals (the third does not have a phone), as well as several other individuals who worked in the same shop at AAD. In addition, IAD has contacted the physician who treated several individuals and sent letters to AAD and his congressmen.

CBR filters were sampled for radiological and chemical parameters – results for both were negative.

Gun tubes were tested for DU and found to be negative.

Other AMC depots were queried about workers experiencing similar problems. No problems were noted.

A memorandum from the facilities Safety Director (see file) indicates that unserviceable air intake filters on M1 tanks contained chromium and therefore were required to be handled as a hazardous waste. In sensitive individuals, chromium has been known to cause contact dermatitis and therefore may explain the rashes reported by some individuals.

Camp Robinson - Feb. 19, 1999

I.  Site Location Information

Camp Joseph T. Robinson is located in North Little Rock, Arkansas. It is the headquarters of the Arkansas National Guard, 90^th Regional Support Command. General phone number: 501-212-5100.

II.  Case Background

In the summer of 1991, a number of vehicles from units of the Arkansas Army National Guard returned to Camp Robinson in Little Rock, Arkansas. A large portion of these vehicles were expected to be brought up to operational, "1020," standards by the maintenance teams at Camp Robinson before being sent out to their respective posts. This work included cleaning, painting, sand blasting, bodywork, and various other vehicle repair work. Several DoD civilians who worked on this retrograde equipment began to complain of various health problems. Symptoms included nosebleeds, eye problems, headaches, or sinus problems. Table 1 shows the sequence of events of the investigation conducted by OSAGWI before the environmental team taking the case.

Table 6. Sequence of investigation events

III.  OSAGWI Investigation

Called a number of the individuals to verify specific information. Results of these interviews revealed the following:

• 14 shop workers report similar symptoms after contact with retrograde equipment. Symptoms include: nose bleeds, eye irritations, headaches, joint pain and others.
• Environmental samples taken of sand removed from equipment were negative for chemical and biological agents. Samples were positive for long- and short-chain hydrocarbons suggesting some contamination from oils and greases.
• Symptoms were short-term and not persistent over time.
• No current symptoms reported by those shop workers who were interviewed by OSAGWI investigators.
• Symptoms were diagnosed as being occupationally related, e.g., "chemical poisoning" from chemicals normally present in the shop; and joint pain caused by a hard (concrete) floor workplace.

Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg) / Wilmington Incident - Feb. 12, 1999

I.  Site Location Information

One of the largest and most active military bases in the eastern USA, Fort Bragg is an Army base in south central North Carolina, located 10 miles NW of Fayetteville. The installation consists of 142,125 acres, much of which is used for ground/air training, with a large cantonment area adjacent to Pope Air Force Base, at the eastern end. Simmons Army Airfield is located at the extreme eastern end of the base. Fort Bragg is headquarters for the Special Operations Command (once called the Psychological Warfare Center), and the Special Warfare Center. It is home also to the 82nd Airborne—the short-notice, worldwide Army unit that gained notoriety as one of the major forces in the Gulf War.

II.  Case Background

In the summer of 1991, roughly May through September, ships transported large amounts of equipment from Operation Desert Shield/Storm back to North Carolina. Though the final destination for this equipment was Ft. Bragg, the port used to unload these ships was at Wilmington, North Carolina.

The primary group responsible for ensuring that the equipment was mechanically ready to make the trip back to Ft. Liberty (formerly Ft. Bragg) was the Directorate of Logistics, a group of DOD civilians based at Ft. Bragg. A number of individuals from this group spent a few months in the summer of 1991 unloading and fixing the vehicles in Wilmington. Several of these individuals have complained of illnesses that they attribute to working on the retrograde equipment.

III. OSAGWI Investigation

OSAGWI began its investigation by contacting the three veterans who called the 1-800 line. Speaking with these individuals led to obtaining the names of a number of others who worked with retrograde equipment at Wilmington; OSAGWI has spoken with eight total workers to date.

After speaking with eight individuals who worked at Wilmington, several clear trends in their discussions began to stand out. The most obvious trend was that the workers had to climb in, on, and around the retrograde equipment. This fact is not surprising, as the workers were all mechanics. A second trend was that there was a good deal of miscellaneous equipment strewn about the retrograde vehicles. All of the individuals that were interviewed explained that the vehicles were littered with trash, used fatigues, and other assorted personal items. It is important to note, however, that the mechanics were generally not involved with handling this miscellaneous equipment.

Though the explanations of the processes of unloading the equipment and the contents of the vehicles were generally very consistent among workers that were interviewed, the descriptions of the condition of the vehicles varied substantially. While some workers characterized the vehicles as being fairly clean and mud, dirt, and sand free, an equal number of workers described them as being filthy. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the vehicles were cleaned in the Persian Gulf before they were loaded onto the ships.

In addition to discussions with the eight workers at Wilmington, OSAGWI spoke with a nurse at the Ft. Liberty (formerly Ft. Bragg) civilian Occupational Health Clinic. She has been on staff at the clinic since before 1991, and explained that there were no real changes in the frequency of total patients or patients with rashes during the summer of 1991. In fact, she does not recall seeing any patients in the clinic relating to exposure to retrograde equipment.

Of the civilian workers who came into contact with retrograde equipment the reported symptoms varied from none to several and included: rashes, fatigue, joint pain, cold-like symptoms, memory loss, mood swings, allergies, Raynaud’s disease, and nerve problems. Clustering was not observed.

1. An acronym list/glossary can be found in TAB A.
2. Information obtained from lead sheets listed in TAB B.
3. Additional details and citations referencing the significant findings of this incident can be found in the Anniston Army Depot discussion in TAB F.
4. Symptoms reported at Camp Robinson were the result of existing conditions within the workplace and not attributed to handling retrograded materials. Analysis of samples taken from suspect equipment were negative for potential chemical and biological contaminants.
5. While the table in TAB C does not reflect all of the information obtained during the course of the veteran interviews, it references the lead sheets where the additional information can be found and provides insight into the veteran's concerns about his or her possible exposure during retrograde activities.
6. TAB D contains the list of questions asked during the interviews.
7. Message from US Commander in Chief Central Command, Base Communications Center 390 COSQ/DONA, to various commands and organizations, Subject: USCENTCOM LOGISTICS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR REDEPLOYMENT, March 23, 1991. Pg. 8.
8. Lead Sheet 12118, Interview with the Command Sergeant Major, 1103rd Transportation Battalion, Sept. 23, 1998.
9. A number of the interviews conducted with veterans supported this finding; Lead Sheet Nos. 12857 (KKMC); 20360 (KKMC); 21810 (Jubayl); 20169 (Jubayl); 15685 (Jubayl); and 8392 (Dhahran) may be considered representative of the total.
10. A number of the interviews conducted with veterans supported this finding; Lead Sheet Nos. 10458 (KKMC); 19143 (Dhahran); 19334 (Ad Dammam, Dhahran, and Camp Doha); and 19349 (Hafir Al Batin) may be considered representative of the total.
11. Lead Sheet 12118, Interview with the Command Sergeant Major, 1103rd Transportation Battalion, Sept. 23, 1998.
12. Lead Sheet 19143, Interview of Operations Officer for the 593rd Area Support Group, Sept. 21, 1998.
13. Lead Sheet 19585, Interview of Officer in Charge of Preventive Medicine, Nov. 4, 1998.
14. Lead Sheet 20268, Interview of Officer in Charge of washdown operations, Nov.23, 1999.
15. Returning equipment was sampled for contaminants at USMC Logistics Base - Albany; US Naval Air Station - Alameda; Anniston Army Depot; and Camp Robinson. Analytical results were negative for chemical and biological agents. See TABS E and F for discussions on the respective sampling events and documentation of results.
16. Brown, Ronald J., "Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991, WITH MARINES IN OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT," History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1995.
17. Value derived from data collected during veteran interviews.
18. Pagonis, W.P. and J.L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass., 1992, p. 157.
19. Value derived from data collected during veteran interviews and represents an average of the cleaning times reported.
20. (2.5 persons/vehicle)x(2,000 vehicles/day)x(120 days)/(30 days/person) = 20,000 persons.
21. This does not represent a random sample of military personnel who handled retrograde equipment. It represents the total number of veterans who called into the DOD Incident Reporting Line and who indicated that they processed or were otherwise involved in handling retrograde materials. Each was asked a series of questions (see TAB D) related to their retrograde equipment activities. A summary of the individual responses can be found in TAB C.
22. Reports of unclean or dirty equipment returning from Operation Desert Shield/Storm were received from a number of civilian employees working at DOD facilities in the US. Lead Sheet Nos. 21098 (Alameda Naval Air Station); 19441 (Camp Robinson); 10222 (Fort Bragg); and 25993 (MCLB, Albany, Ga) may be considered representative of the total.
23. "Clustering of symptoms" signifies a grouping of individuals with common symptoms at a unique location. It aids in the identification of potential 'hot spots' where investigators may focus their attention.
24. U.S. Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, "Technical Information Memorandum No. 31 - Contingency Retrograde Washdowns: Cleaning and Inspection Procedures," December 1993.
25. Lead Sheet 26011, Interview with the OIC of Ground Support Management, USMC Blount Island, April 13, 1999.
26. Lead Sheet Nos. 21517 (Jubayl); 21758 (Jubayl); and 19255 (Dhahran).
27. Lead Sheet Nos. 17824 (KKMC); 15685 (Jubayl); 18522 (Dhahran); 23956 (Dhahran); 19349 (Hafir Al Batin); and 10458 (KKMC).
28. Message from Department of the Army to Commander in Charge of US Army Forces Command, Subject: Safety Alert Decontamination Solution 2, Feb. 21, 1991.
29. Material Safety Data Sheet, "Decontaminating Agent, STB - Super Tropical Bleach", MSDS Serial No. BPFWX, Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia, Nov. 4, 1992.
30. Details surrounding this incident are presented in TAB F. Documentation relating to sampling results is also presented.
31. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, "Toxicological Profile for Chromium", April 1993, pgs. 87-88.
32. Lead Sheet 881, Interviews with civilian doctor and maintenance shop worker, July 23, 1996. 
33. Lead Sheets 19440, 19441, 19442, 19446, 19471, 19473, and 19513, interviews with civilian mechanics and shop workers, October 1998.
34. Lead Sheet 19435, Interview with lab chemist, Oct. 14, 1998.
35. TAB E contains information and details associated with site visits to equipment manufacturers.
36. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, "Toxicological Profile for Chromium", April 1993, pgs. 87-88.
37. Lead Sheet 19435, Interview with lab chemist, Oct. 14, 1998.
38. U.S. Army, Anniston Army Depot memorandum, Subject: "Filters from M1 Series Tanks Returned from Operation Desert Storm," Feb 22, 1994.
39. Lead Sheet 16418, Interview with contractor responsible for unloading fleet hospital ships, May 8, 1998.
40. Letter from the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, US House of Representatives, to Commanding Officer, Fleet Hospital Support Office, Department of the Navy, Subject: Request for information on medical problems experienced by DYNCORP employees, Dec. 18, 1997.
41. Letter from Deputy Assistant Chief for Operation Medicine and Fleet Support, Department of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, to Senior Staff Assistant to the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, US House of Representatives, Subject: Medical problems experienced by DYNCORP employees, Feb. 20, 1998.
42. Letter from Medical Physician, Ear, Nose and Throat Associates of Gadsden, P.A. Gadsden, Alabama, to Commanding Officer, Anniston Army Depot, Subject: Request for analysis of CBR filters, Oct. 19, 1993.
43. Letter from Medical Physician, Ear, Nose and Throat Associates of Gadsden, P.A. Gadsden, Alabama, to Senator Richard Shelby, US Senate, Subject: Request for analysis of CBR filters, Nov. 4, 1993.
44. Letter from Senator Richard Shelby, U.S. Senator, to Chief of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Army, Subject: Request for information regarding medical problems and CBR filter testing at Anniston Army Depot, Nov. 22, 1993.
45. Memorandum from Director, Professional Services, Department of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General, to HQDA, Subject: "Congressional Inquiry Re Medical Issues," Dec. 21, 1993.
46. Memorandum from Safety Director, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama, to Commander, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command and Commander, US Army Material Command, Subject: "Filters from M1 Series Tanks Returned from Operation Desert Storm," Feb. 22, 1994.
47. Memorandum from Command Surgeon, US Army Materiel Command to Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Subject: "Claims of Gulf War Syndrome from AMC Depot Employees Maintaining Material Returned from the Persian Gulf Theatre," May 4, 1994.
48. Letter (draft) from the Office of the Surgeon General, to Senator Richard Shelby, US Senate, Subject: Response to request for information regarding medical issues and filter testing at AAD, (no date).
49. Memorandum from Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses Investigation Team, to US Army Medical Research and Material Command, Fort Detrick, Subject: "Request for Information," Dec. 17, 1995.
50. Memorandum from Commander, US Army Medical Materiel Development Activity, Fort Detrick, to Director, Persian Gulf War Veterans Illnesses Investigation Team, Subject: "Request for Information," Feb. 22, 1996.
51. Memorandum from Persian Gulf Veterans Illnesses Investigation Team, to US Army Medical research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Diagnostic Systems Division, Subject: "Sand Samples relating to Gulf War Illnesses," Aug. 19, 1996.
52. Memorandum from Chief, Diagnostic Systems Division, USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, to Director, Health Services, US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Leonard Wood, Subject: "Request for Biological, Chemical Analysis," Oct. 31, 1996.