One prominent hypothesis about illnesses among Gulf War veterans is that some of the reported symptoms are the result of exposure to chemical warfare agents. During and after the Gulf War, some veterans reported that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. To investigate these incidents, and to assess the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in the Gulf, the Department of Defense developed a methodology for investigation and validation based on work done by the United Nations and the international community. The criteria include:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site such as weapons fragments, soil, water, vegetation or human/animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• The testimony of witnesses;
• Multiple analyses; and

A review of the evidence by experts.

While the methodology (Tab D) used to investigate suspected chemical warfare agent incidents is based on these protocols, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence was often not collected at the time of an event. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents, and each investigation must be tailored to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough, investigative process to define the circumstances of each incident and to determine what happened. Alarms alone are not considered to be certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate the presence of a chemical warfare agent.

After following our methodology and accumulating anecdotal, documentary, and physical evidence; after interviewing witnesses and key specialists; and after analyzing the results of all available information, we assess the validity of the presence of chemical warfare agents on the battlefield. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 1) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. This assessment is tentative, based on facts available as of the date of the report publication; each case is reassessed over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 1. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is based on common sense: Do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were or were not present? When insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence can be found.

Veterans who had been in the Al Jubayl area during Jan. 19-21, 1991, have reported hearing loud noises and seeing bright flashes of light in the night sky. Some people attribute the loud noises and bright flashes to an Iraqi chemical warfare agent attack on Al Jubayl. Although veterans’ descriptions of what happened are generally consistent, they sometimes differ when identifying the specific day(s) in question. After the investigation into the loud noises began, we determined the loud noises and bright flashes occurred during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, and during the evening-early morning hours of Jan. 20-21, 1991, but the primary cause for concern are the incidents that occurred on Jan. 19, 1991. The anxiety caused by the start of the air war, coupled with the incidents in question, made it difficult for some veterans to discriminate among the dates in question. Therefore, the investigation included all the incidents that occurred during the entire three-day period. For clarity, we discuss the events of January 19 and those of January 20-21 separately.

The first loud noise event, as it has come to be known, is a series of incidents that occurred within a relatively short period (3:32-6:30 a.m.) during the early morning of Jan. 19, 1991. The first incident occurred at 3:32 a.m. when the population of Al Jubayl heard a loud noise throughout the entire Al Jubayl area. Veterans described the noise as a single explosion, as two explosions, and as a sonic boom. Fearing an attack, local commanders ordered their units to implement general quarters. Some unit commanders ordered their personnel to put on their protective clothing while other unit commanders refrained from doing so because of shortages of protective clothing. Shortly after the loud noise, the Rear Area Operations Center in Al Jubayl began receiving reports of other incidents in the area. These other incidents include: locations being fired upon; detections of chemical warfare agents; sighting of a white cloud and mist in the air; a flash of light or fireball in the sky; and a propeller-driven aircraft flying over the area. Collectively, these observations caused some veterans to believe that Iraq’s military forces or an Iraqi-sponsored terrorist group had attacked Al Jubayl with chemical warfare agents. In response, nuclear, biological, and chemical teams began testing for the presence of chemical warfare agents. Although some locations initially reported positive test results for nerve agent and blister agent, all later tests were negative.

We have identified Coalition aircraft as the source of the loud noise. The 552d Computer Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, analyzed electronic data recorded during the Gulf War aboard Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft. The data showed that two Coalition aircraft exceeded the speed of sound causing two almost simultaneous sonic booms as they flew over the city of Al Jubayl at 3:27 a.m.—approximately the same time troops on the ground heard and reported the loud noise. We have assessed the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl during the morning of Jan. 19, 1991, as Unlikely.

The second event occurred the following night (Jan. 20-21, 1991), when more explosion-like noises occurred and units in the Al Jubayl area again increased their level of alert and increased their protective posture to level four. Nuclear, biological, and chemical detection teams checked for the presence of chemical warfare agents with negative results. We believe a Scud missile probably caused the explosion-like sounds. At about the time of the explosion-like sounds, Iraq launched a Scud missile toward Dhahran. The missile flying over Al Jubayl at supersonic speeds most likely caused the explosion-like noise. There is also a high probability that a Patriot missile fired from a missile battery defending Dhahran intercepted and destroyed the Scud. Although numerous command log entries and the Scud launch data confirm a Scud launch, there is no record of an impact site. We have assessed the likelihood that chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl during the evening-early morning of Jan. 20-21, 1991, as Unlikely.

After we published the original Al Jubayl case narrative on Aug. 13, 1997, two private citizens presented us with two different scenarios that they believed could relate to the loud noise on Jan. 19, 1991. In the first scenario, they claimed Iraq’s forces launched a Styx missile from an Iraqi fast patrol boat. Aimed at Al Jubayl and armed with a chemical warhead, the missile, caused the loud noise when it detonated. In the second scenario, Iraqi aircraft penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace, flew to Al Jubayl, and sprayed a dusty mustard chemical warfare agent over the city. Iraq’s fighter aircraft providing aircover for the spraying aircraft caused the loud noise.

The Center for Naval Analyses assisted in our investigation of the first scenario by reviewing naval operations’ records from the war for any report of a suspicious vessel (or vessels) operating off the coast of Saudi Arabia at the time of the loud noise on January 19. Finding none, the Center analyzed the capabilities of the surveillance systems used to provide the Coalition’s fleet with early attack warnings. The primary systems were those aboard the United States Navy’s P-3 Orion aircraft and Nimrod aircraft from the United Kingdom. The Center considered the surveillance systems’ swath of coverage, the extent of the aircraft’s patrol area, and the position of the Coalition’s warships to determine if a vessel could have sailed down the coasts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, launched an attack, escaped, and avoided detection. The Center determined the probability of such an event occurring during the war as highly unlikely. We reviewed the information provided by the Center for Naval Analyses together with other information obtained during the course of the investigation and concluded that a Styx missile attack against Al Jubayl on January 19 definitely did not occur.

Just as there were surveillance systems watching the approaches to Coalition warships, there were also surveillance systems monitoring the flight activity of both the Coalition’s air forces and Iraq’s air forces. The United States Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control System was the primary airborne system used during the war. The 552d Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, reviewed the data recorded during the war to determine: 1) if any unidentified aircraft penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, and 2) the likelihood that an Iraqi aircraft could have entered Saudi Arabian airspace while avoiding detection. The 552d Air Control Wing’s analysts subsequently determined that: 1) the only aircraft airborne at the time of the loud noise event were Coalition aircraft, and 2) that it would have been highly unlikely for Iraqi aircraft to have penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace and avoided detection. We subsequently concluded that an aircraft attack on Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991, definitely did not occur.

Our analysis of information collected during this latest investigation of the loud noise event combined with information obtained during our original investigation indicates that Iraq definitely did not attack Al Jubayl on the day in question. We also found no additional information during this latest investigation that conclusively proves or disproves the presence of chemical warfare agents during the period of Jan. 19-21, 1991. Consequently, our assessment of Unlikely as to the presence of chemical warfare agents in Al Jubayl during the period Jan. 19-21, 1991, remains unchanged from our original Al Jubayl case narrative, dated Aug. 19, 1997.

On Feb. 16, 1991, Iraq launched its 66th Scud missile of the war. The Scud (an Al Hussein variant) impacted in the waters of Al Jubayl harbor at approximately 2:00 a.m. The Scud did not detonate and caused no equipment damage or injury to Coalition personnel. Eyewitnesses reported seeing an explosion that looked as if a Patriot missile intercepted the Scud. Although there was a Patriot missile battery near the harbor, it was not operational at the time to shoot down the Scud missile. Salvage operations of the Scud missile began on Feb. 22, 1991, and ended on March 2, 1991, with the recovery of the warhead. During the salvage operations and subsequent efforts to make the warhead safe, explosive ordnance disposal personnel found no evidence of chemical warfare agents—the missile’s warhead contained high explosives. Consequently, our assessment is that the Scud definitely did not contain a chemical warfare agent.

On Mar. 19, 1991, a cloud of noxious fumes enveloped seven Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24. The Seabees sought medical attention after the fumes caused acute short-term symptoms including burning throats, eyes, and noses, and difficulty in breathing. The Seabees reported that portions of their brown T-shirts turned purple, as did parts of their combat boots. None of the seven saw the origin of the cloud, but all believed the cloud came from one of the industrial plants near Camp 13. A master chief equipment operator who witnessed the event positively identified a fertilizer plant located near the camp as the source of the noxious cloud. Five of the seven exposed Seabees immediately sought medical attention, removed their contaminated clothing, showered, changed into clean clothes, and returned to work with no further symptoms. The remaining two Seabees donned their protective clothing and continued to work without interruption and without developing more severe symptoms.

According to a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 medical corpsman, testing of the T-shirts to determine what may have caused them to change color began shortly after the incident. Although no record exists, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24’s medical personnel recall that they collected the T-shirts, bagged them, and turned them over to a group of unnamed Marine officials. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 never received a written report of the analysis but learned via telephone that an exposure to ammonia caused the color change. In July 1993, the US Army Materiel Test Directorate at White Sands Missile Range tested a T-shirt with small holes on its front and back. The origin of the T-shirt is unknown, but we do not believe the T-shirt was one of those that turned purple. The Directorate tested the T-shirt because it may have been worn during the Gulf War and made from similar material (fabric and dyes) as the shirts that turned purple. The Test Directorate could not determine what might have caused the Seabee’s shirts to change color but they surmised from a previous study that some type of an acid caused the holes. Natick Laboratories conducted another analysis in May 1994. As in the previous study by the Army’s Materiel Test Directorate, the T-shirts tested were not among the shirts worn during the purple T-shirt incident, but the shirts’ material (fabric and dyes) was the same or similar type as the shirts worn during the Gulf War. The Natick report states that ammonia (a suspected cause) would not have changed the color of the T-shirts. Only a strong oxidizer like nitric or sulfuric oxide (a common by-product of some industrial operations) could have turned the shirts purple. No combat boots were tested. Our assessment is that no chemical warfare agent was present in Camp 13 and the surrounding area on March 19, 1991, and chemical warfare agents did not cause the T-shirts to change color.

The purple T-shirt event highlights the heavily industrialized environment of Al Jubayl. Its heavy concentration of industries possibly exposed personnel who lived and worked in Al Jubayl to a variety of industrial chemicals. During interviews of personnel stationed in Al Jubayl, we asked for each person's impression of Al Jubayl’s environment. We received both positive and negative comments. To provide as clear a picture as possible of Al Jubayl and the surrounding area, we have included a section in this case narrative devoted to discussing Al Jubayl’s environment.

During the pre-deployment phase of Operation Desert Shield, military planners became aware of the heavy concentration of industry in Al Jubayl. The large number of industrial complexes located within a relatively small geographic area was of special concern. Many of these facilities used, produced, or stored industrial chemicals that could pose a serious health risk to military personnel, if they were exposed. The large number of personnel and amount of equipment that arrived and departed through Al Jubayl compounded the problem.

Because of these concerns, military planners initiated several studies to determine what hazards existed in Al Jubayl. The studies confirmed that the Saudi Arabian government had stringent environmental standards, similar to United States Environmental Protection Agency standards, in place long before the commencement of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1988, the United Nations Environment Program declared the city of Al Jubayl to be as clean as any comparable city in the world.

Since the end of the Gulf War, several Seabees, primarily from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, have reported experiencing a variety of medical conditions that they attribute to their deployment to the Gulf. This has received national attention because the Seabees are from the same unit. Conclusions based on medical studies completed to date are inconclusive and do not identify a single factor as a likely cause for the Seabees’ ailments.

On Aug. 13, 1997, the predecessor to our Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments published an interim Al Jubayl [2] case narrative.[3] The narrative reported on an investigation of three separate events that occurred during the Gulf War at the port city of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. Through veteran testimony during congressional committee hearings, testimony before the Presidential Advisory Commission, news reports, and interviews of Gulf War veterans, these events became known as the "loud noise event," the "Scud impact event," and the "purple T-shirt event."

Veterans responded to the release of the interim case narrative. On Sept. 5, 1997, we met with two individuals who wished to discuss the loud noise event.[4] During the meeting, the two individuals presented two scenarios challenging our assessment of the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. They believed that Iraqi military action—not the sonic booms from Coalition aircraft reported in the original case narrative—caused the loud noise. We agreed to investigate the new scenarios.

As the new investigation of the loud noise event progressed, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed the previously published case narrative. In their report, the GAO agreed with the finding and assessment of the original investigation of the loud noise event. However, the GAO criticized the narrative because it did not address the medical problems that some veterans, many of whom were assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, have experienced since returning home from the Gulf. The GAO recommended that we include this information in any updates to the narrative.[5]

This edition of the Al Jubayl narrative updates the original version, includes an analysis of the two scenarios, and addresses the GAO’s concerns. The focus of this paper is the investigation of the alleged incidents and is not a primer on chemical weapons, chemical warfare agents, or Iraq’s chemical weapons program.[6]

Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, is the largest of eight planned industrial cities designed to take advantage of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil resources. The city is located on the Persian Gulf coast (Figure 2), approximately 250 kilometers south of the Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti border. The Saudis developed the Al Jubayl area as an industrial city in the early 1980s. Before that time, the land where Al Jubayl now stands was an uninhabited desert coastline.

Figure 2. Map of Saudi Arabia

Al Jubayl City consists of an industrial zone and port facilities (Figure 3). The city also contains a residential area and other non-commercial areas. The industrial zone of Al Jubayl is a nine-kilometer by nine-kilometer area, (5.5 miles by 5.5 miles) located approximately five kilometers (3 miles) inland. Jubayl Naval Air Facility lies northwest of the city, approximately 20 kilometers inland. King Abdul Aziz Naval Base (KAANB) is a naval station and airfield complex located on the coast, five kilometers southeast of the city.

Figure 3. King Fahd industrial port and Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia

Housing camps existed throughout the industrial zone to house the work force. US forces used several of these camps as billeting and administrative spaces. Two Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), NMCB-40 and NMCB-24, occupied Camp 13 throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Camp 13, which was temporarily renamed Camp Rohrbach, was located in the north central part of the industrial area (Figure 3). The Seabees of NMCB-40 and NMCB-24 were the first tenants of Camp 13. The Saudis had built the camp some years before but never used it. During the Gulf War, Camp 13 was a fenced, 0.5 square kilometer (0.2 square mile) compound surrounded by various industrial plants, including a fertilizer plant, petrochemical plants, and a steel company. The Seabeesused an area located directly across the street from the main camp as the motor pool.[7] Other units of other Coalition forces near Camp 13 included the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) 32 Heavy Regiment Royal Artillery,[8] and maybe a Saudi Arabian military unit located in the area of Camp 13.

Al Jubayl played a crucial role during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Almost all Marine Corps personnel and many Army units deployed through this port city. The Navy positioned several fleet hospitals in the area, and the Air Force had units on the ground to support airlift missions and medical evacuation missions.[9]

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units occupied Al Jubayl (Tab B). The US Marine Corps’ I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and 3d Marine Air Wing were located there. A detachment from the Army’s 702nd Transportation Battalion, a Patriot missile battery, and other military units were in the immediate harbor area, at local airfields, and in the industrial areas throughout the city (as were Camps 5, 13, and 15). Although many units were in Al Jubayl before the ground war, most combat and combat support units moved to the north for the ground war. Two units that remained in Al Jubayl, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, and the Coast Guard’s Port Security Unit 301, are important in this narrative.

To obtain as much information as possible, we reviewed documents from other units located in Al Jubayl and conducted interviews of personnel assigned to those units. Tab B provides a listing of units that passed through or remained in Al Jubayl during the dates of events in this narrative; it does not cover the entire Gulf War deployment period.

1. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24

The Navy activated Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (NMCB-24), a reserve unit headquartered in Huntsville, Alabama, in November 1990. NMCB-24 arrived in Saudi Arabia in December 1990 and reported to the 3rd Naval Construction Regiment. NMCB-24’s mission was to support the I Marine Expeditionary Force and other Coalition engineering and construction requirements. NMCB-24 was collocated at Camp 13 with NMCB-40, an active-duty Seabee unit that arrived at Camp 13 in September 1990. The commanding officer of NMCB-40 was also the commandant of Camp 13. NMCB-24 consisted of five companies: Headquarters, A, B, and C at Camp 13, and Company D (referred to as the air detachment or Air Det) 10 kilometers away at the KAANB. In addition to its regular complement of reservists, approximately 100 Seabees from other US-based reserve units augmented NMCB-24. NMCB-24’s assigned personnel totaled 724 enlisted and 24 officers.

NMCB-24 conducted construction operations in and around Al Jubayl, and deployed forces to Al Khanjar (referred to as Camp Smith or Lonesome Dove) and Al Jabar airfield in Kuwait. NMCB-24 returned to the United States on Apr. 26, 1991.

2. U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Unit 301

U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Unit 301 (PSU-301) was an activated U.S .Coast Guard reserve unit manned by personnel from Coast Guard reserve units throughout the United States. PSU-301 deployed in two phases—PSU-301-A and PSU-301-B. PSU-301-A deployed in September 1990 and PSU-301-B relieved 301-A in early March 1991.[10]

With its headquarters in the port area of Al Jubayl, the PSU’s primary mission was to conduct harbor patrol and surveillance, including interception, search, and apprehension of all suspicious or unidentified vessels in the area of the port and harbor. PSU-301 patrolled the harbor and performed other port security operations using Raider gunboats (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Raider gunboat

3. U.S. Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team, Detachment 33

A third unit that played an important role in Al Jubayl was the US Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team, Detachment 33. Members of Detachment 33 recovered components of a Scud missile after it came down and sank in the waters of Al Jubayl harbor.

Veterans in the Al Jubayl area during Jan. 19-21, 1991, report hearing a loud noise or explosion and seeing a bright flash of light in the night sky. Some people attribute the loud noise and bright flash to an Iraqi chemical warfare agent attack on Al Jubayl.[11] Although veteran descriptions of the loud noise are generally consistent, their descriptions sometimes differ on specifics such as the day(s) in question or the weather conditions at the time. After we began our investigation into the loud noise, we determined the loud noise and bright flash occurred during the early morning of Jan. 19, 1991, and during the evening/early morning of Jan. 20-21, 1991, but it is the incident that occurred on January 19 that some veterans believe was an Iraqi chemical warfare agent attack. The anxiety caused by the start of the air war coupled with the incidents in question has made it difficult for some veterans to discriminate among the dates in question. Therefore, we investigated reports of incidents during the entire three-day period. For clarity, we discuss the incidents of January 19 and January 20-21 separately.

We interviewed 67 NMCB-24 personnel, including the command staff, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) team members, medical personnel, and unit personnel. Seven of these individuals also testified before Congress. Their recollections differed. Some recalled a mist in the air, which indicated the presence of a significant concentration of an airborne substance,[12] while others recalled a blowing wind and no mist.[13] Some veterans recalled an immediate onset of symptoms (burning eyes and skin) while others did not experience any symptoms.[14] There was also disagreement concerning the operational status of the M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarms issued to NMCB-24.[15] The M8A1 alarms did not detect any chemical warfare agents at Camp 13 during Jan. 19-21, 1991.

1. Jan. 19, 1991, Chronology

At approximately 3:30 a.m.[16] on Jan. 19, 1991, many people in the Al Jubayl area heard a very loud noise. Believing an attack occurred, units in the area increased their alert status.[17] At 3:25 a.m., a Camp 13 security guard at post 5 reported two blasts west of Camp 13. A second security guard reported that a white cloud was moving toward Camp 13 from the south.[18] At 4:07 a.m., the NMCB-24 NBC officer had an NBC team member check for the presence of chemical warfare agents at Camp 13 using an M256A1 detection kit. The test was negative. The NBC team conducted a second check using the M256A1 kit at 4:59 a.m.. This test was also negative. A log entry made at 5:01 a.m. noted that testing for chemical warfare agents in the port area also produced negative results.[19] At 5:41 a.m., Camp 13 returned to Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level 0+[20] and returned to normal operations at 5:45 a.m.[21] The log of the NMCB-24 Air Detachment at KAANB contains entries noting a sonic boom at 3:30 a.m., an air raid at 4:00 a.m., and an all clear at 5:00 a.m. There is no record of air detachment personnel running any chemical detection tests.[22]

However, during congressional testimony and in interviews with our investigators, a Seabee from NMCB-24’s air detachment said he conducted M256A1 tests that were positive for mustard agent two out of three times.[23] No one recorded these detections in either the NMCB-24 command log or air detachment logs, and there are no records that anyone reported such an event to higher headquarters. The air detachment Seabee testified that he informed the air detachment’s leaders of the positive M256A1 test results. An officer who was the assistant officer-in-charge of the air detachment stated he was in a position to receive such a report but never heard of these positive tests.[24] In an interview with one of our investigators, the NMCB-24 air detachment officer-in-charge (OIC) stated that the person who reported the positive tests had been detailed by the air detachment to the Marine chemical, biological, and radiological element at KAANB. The detachment OIC also stated that during attack alerts, this individual was under the control and direction of the Marine’s Defense Operations. The detachment OIC emphasized that he and his air detachment personnel were under the control of the KAANB commander, who was a Marine colonel. Any chemical, biological, or radiological monitoring, surveying, reporting, or decontamination operations took place under the direction and control of the KAANB commander. The air detachment OIC stated that the Marines (of Marine Air Group 13) were sensitive to the timely flow of information up and down the chain of command. The air detachment OIC does not remember anyone reporting to him that someone had detected blister agent. He stated that he would have remembered such a report, and the talk about a chemical detection during the early morning hours was exactly that, talk. He said that he and all the rest of the tenant unit commanders were in their areas of responsibility during the loud noise event and there were no reports from any unit or the Marine Air Group 13 chemical, biological, and radiological team that anyone detected any agent or that there were any injuries suffered or treated.[25]

There were no casualties reported during or after the events of Jan. 19, 1991. However, the Seabee who claimed he conducted the positive M256A1mustard agent tests also identified another Seabee in the air detachment who developed a blister on his wrist under his wristwatch. Both Seabees believe a mustard agent caused the blister.[26] During an interview, a hospital corpsman senior chief, the senior medical corpsman for NMCB-40 and Camp 13, stated that he does not remember the individual from the air detachment who developed a blister, but added that he treated a lot of similar cases at Camp 13. He said ringworm or some other fungus most likely caused the blister under the wristwatch. He explained that if a watch was worn too tightly, heat and humidity built up under the watch, creating perfect conditions for a fungus to grow.[27] The individual who developed the blister under his watch said during an interview that he went to see NMCB-24’s doctor a couple of days after the incident. He said that even though the doctor told him the blister was ring worm he still believed chemicals caused the blister.[28]

During this period, a U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) NBC log entry at 4:30 a.m. noted that there was an earlier report of a chemical attack at Al Jubayl. A British unit (not identified in the log) reported a slight reading for mustard agent by a chemical agent monitor (CAM). A British NBC team sent to the site of the reading to conduct further tests did not obtain a positive indication for a chemical warfare agent and reported all clear to the USCENTCOM NBC cell.[29] At 4:40 a.m., the British reported that another one of their units was getting a positive reading for mustard using M9 Chemical Agent Detection Paper[30] and that unit personnel heard a propeller-driven aircraft in the area. At 5:10 a.m., the USCENTCOM NBC cell contacted the British NBC team that attempted to verify the earlier reported positive detections and found the British NBC team was not wearing chemical protective clothing and had not had any positive M9 paper readings. Because of the conflicting reports, USCENTCOM dispatched NBC teams at 5:18 a.m. to the sites where the British detections occurred (near Camp 5 in the industrial zone) to recheck the area. At 6:15 a.m., a USCENTCOM NBC team, led by a chief warrant officer, performed a reconnaissance of the area between the two British detections. A log entry made at 7:48 a.m. indicated that the team tested for chemical warfare agents with no positive readings and that two separate sweeps found no chemicals or debris in the area. This entry does note the discovery of a large diesel fuel spill in the middle of the suspect area.[31]

Eyewitnesses at Camp 13 described seeing a large fireball or bright flash that illuminated the sky, an explosion or concussion wave, and a mist in the air.[32] One veteran reported seeing a flare fired from the USS Tarawa presumably at the time the loud noise event occurred.[33] Quotes from NMCB-24 Seabees that appeared in a newspaper article include: "I remember getting woke up by this humongous explosion—it almost knocked us out of our bunks." "I am a Vietnam War vet, and my thoughts were that it was a rocket." "[I initially] thought it was incoming artillery rounds." "Right after I got into the bunker, my lips started turning numb and the numbness lasted for several days." "Nobody believed it was a sonic boom—nobody. I’ve been in the military most of my life and I know that a sonic boom doesn’t leave a flash of red light in the damn sky."[34] Eyewitnesses also stated that those experiencing symptoms reported for medical attention within the next few days. We interviewed the NMCB-24 commander, medical personnel, and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to Camp 13 and reviewed the unit’s sick-call logs. We found no record that any individual sought medical attention on January 19th or during the following days for the symptoms that are consistent with an exposure to a chemical warfare agent or injuries resulting from an attack using conventional munitions.[35]

Several witnesses located at Camp 13 stated that they smelled an ammonia-like odor, while others do not recall any significant odor.[36] NMCB-24’s Camp 13 logs do not mention the presence of any odor during the time of the loud noise. Some personnel have stated that they were unprotected during that time and exhibited no symptoms that would have indicated exposure to a chemical warfare agent.[37] A Seabee assigned to NMCB-24 (Camp 13) stated that during the alert he volunteered to leave his bunker to conduct a M256A1 chemical warfare agent test. Once outside, he became aware that he had forgotten his protective gloves in the bunker. He elected not to return to the bunker for his gloves and continued to test for the presence of chemical warfare agents. He stated that he did not develop any of the symptoms related to an exposure to a chemical warfare agent.[38]

Records of other units stationed in Al Jubayl contain information that describes loud noises on Jan. 19, 1991. For example, the NMCB-24 air detachment log contains an entry reporting the sonic boom at 3:30 a.m.[39] The command history of the British Critical Facility Force describes the positive blister agent reading by British forces.[40] The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) journals also contain entries that discuss the British detections.[41] The logistics operations center’s daily update indicates that the reported mustard attack at Al Jubayl was actually an ammonia plant setting off alarms and that the booms were from aircraft.[42] The KAANB commander (a Marine aviator) also stated that he was told that two aircraft made the loud noise. He said it was the loudest sonic boom he had ever heard. He said that immediately after hearing the noise, he called his command center and the duty watch told him the Marine Tactical Air Control Center had informed them that the source of the loud noise was two Tornado F3 aircraft heading towards the north.[43]

2. Identifying the Source of the Loud Noise

Thus far, we have discussed information obtained from unit logs and personal interviews. Certainly, many people heard a loud noise during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991. What is debatable, however, is the source of the loud noise. During interviews, many veterans stated that an incoming Scud missile caused the loud noise. Others believe aircraft caused the loud noise. Records show no Scud launches directed towards the vicinity of Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991.[44] However, on this third day of the air campaign, the skies were full of aircraft flying to their assigned targets, flying air defense missions, or flying to their temporary home station. We reviewed the Air Force Central Command Air Tasking Order for the air campaign. The air tasking order shows that Central Command scheduled several sorties during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, that would have overflown Al Jubayl.[45] To determine if the loud noise heard in Al Jubayl was a sonic boom from aircraft, we asked the 552d Air Control Wing to review surveillance data recorded during the war aboard Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Specialists from the Air Force’s 552d Computer Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, analyzed the recorded AWACS data. The data showed that at approximately 3:32 a.m., two Coalition aircraft (aircraft A and B shown in Figure 5) were exceeding the speed of sound[46] as they flew over Al Jubayl from the northwest to the southeast. This was approximately the same time people in the area reported the loud noise. Aircraft A flew the closest to Camp 13 and was accelerating through 638 knots (734 miles per hour) to 652 knots (750 mph) while flying over the city at 3:27:50 a.m. Aircraft A continued to accelerate out over the Persian Gulf, reaching a top speed of 924 knots (1062 mph) at 3:33:53 a.m. Aircraft B flew over the outskirts of Al Jubayl. Aircraft B approached Al Jubayl at 3:27:16 a.m. at a speed of 700 knots (805 mph) and accelerated as it passed by the city, reaching a top speed of 873 knots (1003.95 mph) at 3:27:57 a.m.. The altitude of both aircraft exceeded 29,000 feet as they flew over Al Jubayl.[47]

Figure 5.  Flight paths of aircraft that caused the loud noise (sonic boom)

3. Weather Information

The weather conditions at the time of the loud noise incident would have affected what was seen and heard during the loud noise event. As already indicated, veteran’s recollections of weather conditions during the loud noise sometimes differ. Unfortunately, a specific weather observation for Al Jubayl is not available. Therefore, we relied on regional weather data provided by the US Air Force’s Environmental Technical Applications Center.[48] The data indicate that during the early morning hours of Jan. 19, 1991, low clouds with bases at 100-200 feet covered both Iraq and Saudi Arabia; winds were east to southeasterly at 5-15 knots; visibility throughout the area was near zero in dense fog; and temperatures ranged from lows of 0-10 degrees Celsius (32-50 degrees Fahrenheit) to highs of 10-18 degrees Celsius (34-64 degrees Fahrenheit).[49] The dense fog may be what some veterans referred to as a mist or droplets of water in the air. In addition to the Air Force’s weather data, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense indicated in its report that a temperature inversion existed over the area.[50]

4. Air Force Research Laboratory's Analysis of Al Jubayl Sonic Boom Data

We thought the weather conditions at the time the sonic boom(s) occurred over Al Jubayl affected the sound level of the sonic boom(s) and caused them to sound much louder than normal. To check our theory, we contacted the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio[51] and asked them to review the sonic boom information contained in this narrative and to determine if the weather had any impact on the sonic booms. The research laboratory reviewed the material and analyzed the data. Although they confirmed the existence of the temperature inversion over Al Jubayl and agreed that a temperature inversion can amplify a sonic boom, they concluded that in this case the inversion had no effect on the sonic boom. Rather, it is their opinion that the sonic booms from both aircraft came together somewhere within the Camp 13 to create a louder (or stronger) than normal sonic boom called a focus boom. Conditions that existed at the time of the loud noise incident (weather conditions and the flight profiles of the sonic boom aircraft) could have caused variations in overpressure (the sonic boom) from 7 pounds per square foot to 21 pounds per square foot. Sonic booms of that magnitude startle most people. It is also highly probable that persons in Camp 13 or those who were close to the point where the focus boom reached the surface could have interpreted the sonic boom as an explosion.[52,53]

During the evening of January 20 between 9:40 and 9:50 p.m., authorities issued a Scud[113] alert and air raid sirens sounded throughout Al Jubayl.[114] Consequently, units in the area went to MOPP-4. At 10:30 p.m., units secured from general quarters and returned to MOPP-0. At 12:46 a.m. on Jan. 21, 1991, the air raid sirens sounded again.[115] The NMCB-24 security log notes two explosions, 15 to 20 seconds apart, southeast of Camp 13 at 12:54 a.m..[116] At 1:15 a.m., units returned to normal operations.[117] The NMCB-24 security logs also noted that Saudi sirens sounded at 1:42 a.m..[118] The NMCB-24 air detachment log notes Scud alerts occurring at 10:00 p.m. on January 20 and at 12:45 a.m., 3:30 a.m., and 9:50 p.m. on Jan. 21, 1991. Approximately 20 minutes after each alert, the all clear was given.[119]

USCENTCOM NBC logs for Jan. 20-21, 1991, note that at 9:47 p.m. on January 20 Iraq fired two Scud missiles towards Al Jubayl-Dhahran and US forces fired four Patriot missiles in response—destroying the Scuds in the air. A 10:00 p.m. entry in the NBC log indicates that a Patriot battery fired five Patriots at a third suspected Scud. The NBC log notes the Patriots destroyed the missile, which may have targeted Dhahran. The USCENTCOM logs contain no entries to indicate the presence of chemical warfare agents in the Al Jubayl area during Jan. 20-21, 1991.[120]

Based upon available information, we have concluded that the loud noises were not the result of an attack upon Al Jubayl. The basis of our conclusion is the following:

• Entries in command logs and the Scud launch database show that several Scud missile launches occurred at approximately the same time as the events recorded in logs of units located in Al Jubayl. Although Al Jubayl was not the intended target, the Scuds flew over Al Jubayl on their way to their targets. Patriot missiles reportedly intercepted and destroyed the Scuds as they neared the targeted cities;
• There is no record of any impact site in the Al Jubayl area; and,
• We found no records of any individual receiving medical treatment for symptoms associated with exposure to chemical or biological warfare agents.

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) completed its own investigation of incidents that comprise what we refer to as the loud noise event. Although we cooperated with the MOD’s investigators, the MOD investigation team relied almost entirely on information developed from their own sources. As we did, the UK investigators relied upon veterans’ recollections, unit logs, diaries, and other official documents that have survived the postwar years.

The UK’s report contributes to our investigation in several ways. First, it independently verifies information contained in our original case narrative of Aug. 13, 1997. Second, it names the military units that, until now, our case narrative identified only as British forces’ units. Third, it provides information on incidents not identified in US documents or made known through US veteran interviews. Finally, the UK report provides the UK MOD’s assessment of the likelihood that Iraq’s forces or a terrorist group employed chemical warfare agents against Coalition forces in Al Jubayl.

1. Verification of Information

The UK MOD report provides information that allows us to verify the incidents reported by our veterans. The MOD report confirms reports of two explosions or loud noises and bright flashes in the night sky.[121] The MOD report also contains a discussion of the British forces’ positive chemical warfare agent detections that later proved false.[122] However, we can correlate only one of the three UK detections mentioned in the MOD report with the ones identified in the RAOC radio log. That is because the MOD report does not contain the grid coordinates for two detections and the times for the detections do not match those recorded in the RAOC log even though the RAOC log identifies these detections as the first and second FMA detections. A direct correlation can be made between the third detection shown in the RAOC log and the third FMA detection discussed in the MOD report because the grid coordinates provided in the MOD report match those in the RAOC log. The MOD report also discusses the presence of a mist in the air and the sighting of a vapor cloud at the time the loud noise occurred.[123] A log from the British Main Repair Group 11 contains evidence of the sighting of a vapor cloud southwest of the Repair Group’s position—a cement factory one kilometer north of Camp 13.[124]

2. Identification of Military Units

The UK’s forces occupied positions throughout Al Jubayl, from the northern industrial area of the city near Camp 13 to the less developed areas to the south near KAANB. The unit identified in the RAOC log by the acronym FMA was the Force Maintenance Area.[125] The FMA provided combat service support to the 7th Armoured Brigade. The FMA NBC Cell, located at the Old Port Barracks made reports to the RAOC. Figure 27 at Tab G shows the identities of the UK units and their locations in Al Jubayl.

3. New Information

The MOD report provides information on several incidents that we did not address in our original Al Jubayl case narrative. The first involves a possible explanation for the flashes seen over Al Jubayl.[126] A second incident involves a propeller-driven aircraft reportedly leaking aviation fuel as it flew over the city.[127] The third incident involves an intelligence report that the "Iraqis were loading chemical weapons somewhere in Kuwait."[128]

a. Bright Flashes

The UK’s report provides another possible explanation for the bright flashes seen at the time of the loud noise. The UK’s 27 Regiment Royal Corps of Transport notified the FMA NBC Cell that it had fired what the British call a maroon during the chemical alert. A maroon is a type of warning device that, when fired, sounds three bangs to give an audible signal. During the Gulf War, British units equipped maroons with flares to provide a visual warning. The MOD’s report suggests that the flash from the maroon’s flares could have been what people saw and assumed that an attack occurred. The report does not specify when the 27 Regiment fired the maroons, the number the regiment fired, or the location from where the regiment fired them—other than to say the launch site was a quarry some distance away from Al Jubayl. Soon after the 27 Regiment notified the FMA NBC cell that it had fired maroons, the officer-in-charge of the FMA NBC cell issued orders to discontinue their use because that using maroons as warning devices only led to further confusion during an alert.[129]

b. Chemical Warfare Agent Detections

The MOD’s report provides a detailed explanation of the CWA detection by their forces. The report indicates the number and identity of the British units that had a positive CWA detection. The information presented in the MOD’s report also illustrates that problems associated with CWA detection and reporting are not limited to our own forces. For example, the MOD’s report informs us that there were CWA detections by seven British units but the FMA NBC cell was only informed of five detections. The report also indicates that some British forces, like our own forces,[130] may have used out-of-date equipment, which could have led to the false positive detections. In addition, the MOD report shows that units did not adequately log some detections, did not forward reports to higher headquarters, such as the FMA NBC cell. In some cases, no surviving record exists of the report arriving at a higher headquarters. The MOD report also points to problems in disseminating information to command elements in Al Jubayl, e.g., a discrepancy in the number of detections reported to the FMA and the number recorded in the RAOC log.[131]

c. Aircraft Fuel Leak

As the excitement of January 19 waned, Coalition authorities began searching for the cause or causes of the false positive detections reported by British forces. One theory blamed the false detections on some type of fuel. This agreed with a USCENTCOM NBC log entry that identified the cause for at least one detection as diesel fuel.[132]

Both US and UK documents contain mention of a propeller-driven aircraft flying over the Al Jubayl area at about the same time as the loud noise. An entry in the USCENTCOM NBC desk log noted a report that British forces heard a propeller-driven aircraft flying in the area.[133] An entry in a British unit’s log noted that troops from that unit heard a light aircraft before each of the explosions. The diary of the British Army’s Scientific Advisory Group also contained an entry about the sound of a light aircraft.[134] The squadron leader in charge of the FMA NBC cell hypothesized that the light aircraft leaked fluid (e.g., fuel, oil, etc.) as it flew over Al Jubayl causing the false detections. He recalled checking with the officials at KAANB who told him that no damaged aircraft landed that morning. Later that day, the squadron leader spoke to someone at KAANB, identified only as a USMC operations officer, who told him that an aircraft (possibly an OV-10) had dumped fuel before landing earlier that morning, presumably at the time of the false positive CWA detections. Thinking he had proved his hypothesis, the squadron leader notified both the Commander British Forces Middle East and joint headquarters that, in his opinion, fuel dumped from an aircraft—not a chemical warfare attack—caused the spurious alarms in Al Jubayl.[135] As demonstrated by the following message from the Director for Operations to the Air Staff, higher levels of command apparently supported the hypothesis.[136]

All locations which detected an agent were under the flight path of a battle damaged OV10A which recovered to an adjacent airfield around the time of the incident. As area [sic] in classic meteorological inversion at the time, it is suspected that the AC [aircraft] was releasing fuel or some other liquid which would have fallen onto the area as a fine spray and alerted chemical detection equipment.

The next day, Jan. 20, 1991, a message went to all units within the UK attributing the false positive detections to fuel leaking from a damaged aircraft.[137] British authorities also used this explanation to account for the mists, vapor, and droplets of liquid reported by British troops in Al Jubayl.

Investigators from the MOD asked us to assist them in determining whether a propeller-driven aircraft flew over Al Jubayl at 3:30 a.m. and if fuel leaking from the aircraft could have caused the false detections, as well as the reported mist and vapor.[138] Our analysis of the suspected aircraft is contained in Section III G of this narrative.d. Intelligence ReportThe UK report also refers to an unconfirmed intelligence report about Iraq loading chemical munitions in Kuwait. UK investigators believe this intelligence report came from the Kuwaiti resistance through the Central Intelligence Agency.[139] As of this writing, we have found no record of such a report among U.S. Gulf War documents.

4. Ministry of Defence Assessment

The UK MOD assessed that UK troops were almost certainly not exposed to Iraqi chemical warfare agents. They based their assessment on three facts:

• "First, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the delivery systems that Iraq was thought to have available for chemical weapons were used against the FMA on that occasion."[140]
• "Secondly, there is no evidence that there were any casualties on 19 January, or on subsequent days, from units in the FMA, who showed symptoms similar to those that would result from exposure to CW agents."[141]
• "Thirdly, the examination of equipment returned from the FMA to the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down, with only one minor exception, did not indicate exposure to Iraqi CW agent."[142]

The UK MOD’s hypothesis of an aircraft leaking fuel as it flew over Al Jubayl presented a plausible answer for the three false positive detections reported by British forces. During our original investigation of the loud noise event, a small number of US veterans reported hearing a propeller-driven aircraft flying overhead at about the same time as the loud noise. A USCENTCOM NBC log entry notes the propeller-driven aircraft.[143] However, during the original investigation, we did not connect the propeller-driven aircraft to the loud noise event. When presented with the two alternate scenarios explaining the cause of the loud noise event and after the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence requested our help to determine whether a light aircraft leaked fuel over the city, we reconsidered the light aircraft.

Again, we turned to the 552d Air Control Wing at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma for answers. We asked the 552d to determine if a propeller driven aircraft flew over Al Jubayl at the time of the loud noise.[144] The AWACS data revealed that an aircraft did take off from KAANB at 3:35 a.m. After taking off, the aircraft flew around KAANB at low altitude, never exceeding 2,600 feet, for 11 minutes and then returned to the airfield (Figures 6 & 7).[145] Figure 8 shows the aircraft’s route of flight relative to the location of the false positive detections. The aircraft came no closer than one and one-half miles to the location of the first false positive detection. At that point, the aircraft’s airspeed was 133 knots at an altitude of 1,600 feet. Considering the distance from the false detections, it is unlikely that this aircraft caused the false positive detections. Even if the aircraft was leaking fuel, it is still doubtful that it caused the false detections. That is because fuel leaking from an airborne aircraft atomizes and evaporates before reaching the ground. A catastrophic event resulting in a rapid loss of a large quantity of fuel at low altitude could result in fuel reaching the ground, but we found no evidence of such an event in the Al Jubayl area on the morning in question.

Figure 6. Flight path of the propeller-driven aircraft

Figure 7.  Close-up flight path of the propeller-driven aircraft

Figure 8. Northern most points of the propeller-driven aircraft’s flight path relative to the British forces CWA detections

During the Gulf War, 88 Scud missiles impacted within the Kuwait theater of operations.[147] The attack against Al Jubayl occurred a little over a month into the war and was the 66th missile Iraq launched.[148]

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on Feb. 16, 1991, Iraq launched an Al Hussein variant of the Scud missile. Sensors detected the missile early in flight and provided prompt warning of the launch. The Scud impacted in the harbor waters, approximately 150 meters from the commercial pier (the location of an ammunition storage site) and approximately 1,000 meters from the USS Tarawa. Other ships in the harbor at the time included the USS Button, the USS Cleveland, and a Merchant Marine vessel—the Santa Adele.[149] The missile’s warhead did not detonate and caused no damage. The US Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment 33 recovered most of the missile’s components, including the warhead, from the harbor floor.

A Patriot missile battery in Al Jubayl on February 16 received the launch warning, but the battery was not operational for maintenance reasons and did not engage the incoming missile.[150]

According to excerpts from the US Navy’s EOD Detachment 33 log, air raid sirens sounded in the city, the Harbor Defense Command went to condition Red, and the Rear Area Operations Center went to condition Yellow.[151] The Port Security Unit 301 (PSU-301) duty officer heard an explosion outside the command tent, in the air and to the west. He recalls seeing white-hot luminescent objects still in the air. He ordered the unit to general quarters, the highest level of alert, and contacted the Harbor Defense Command. After the duty officer increased the alert level, PSU-301’s three remaining Raider patrol boats got underway.[152]

PSU-301 and EOD boat crews responded rapidly to the Scud impact site. By 2:30 a.m., an EOD boat and a PSU-301 Raider had arrived at the scene. However, due to smoke and the strong smell of missile fuel,[153] the PSU 301 boat backed away. The EOD team surveyed the harbor’s surface near the reported impact site and focused on an area that was bubbling and emitting strong smelling fumes. Approximately 20 minutes later, the EOD team marked the area with a buoy and returned to base.

At 7:20 a.m., the EOD team returned to the site to check the status of the marked area. Bubbles were still rising to the surface and the same strong smell remained in the area. At approximately 9:30 a.m., an EOD boat equipped with an Underwater Damage Assessment Television System (UDATS) surveyed the harbor bottom. After lowering the UDATS and surveying the area around the buoy, the team located missile debris, including an item that resembled a warhead. At 2:50 p.m., the EOD team made its first dive at the impact site. The divers confirmed the location of an intact Scud warhead, along with the guidance section, rocket engine, and miscellaneous components. The missile’s major components had separated from each other, confirming that the missile had broken apart.[154]

1. Scud Missile Recovery Operation

In preparation for recovery operations, EOD personnel spent Feb. 17, 1991, consulting with their technical information center at Indian Head, Maryland. EOD personnel also made the requisite notifications to their command in Bahrain and to other commands located in the immediate port area. As expected, they also responded to numerous requests for more detailed information.

On February 18, the detachment’s divers continued their survey of the harbor floor, and mapped the site using the UDATS. From February 19 to 21, the EOD team extensively searched the harbor bottom and recovered smaller Scud components with the aid of the underwater camera system. Divers also located and marked a fuel tank for retrieval.

At 8:00 a.m. on February 22, the EOD team began salvage operations. Using lifting balloons, they retrieved three major components: the fuel tank (Figure 9), the guidance section, and the rocket engine (Figure 10). A crane hoisted the missile pieces out of the water. While the components were suspended, EOD personnel sprayed them with a fire hose to flush out seawater and any remaining caustic substances. The EOD crew flushed out the pieces for a second time once they were on the pier. Later, the team took the components to the EOD base camp for temporary storage.[155] After the EOD team finished examining the recovered Scud components on February 23, they transferred custody of the missile to the Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center, a Coalition entity responsible for collecting captured foreign military equipment throughout the Kuwait theater of operations.[156]

Figure 9.  The recovered Scud's fuel tank

<

Figure 10. The recovered Scud's guidance section and rocket engine

Recovery of the warhead began on March 2, 1991, at 6:00 a.m. Although EOD divers reportedly collected sediment samples from the area near the warhead before its recovery from the harbor, we have found no records of these samples.[157] By 1:20 p.m., EOD personnel had removed the warhead from the water and had begun to defuse the warhead. Subsequent test found the warhead contained high explosives and not chemical warfare agents.[158]

During the operation, EOD personnel used an M18A2 kit[161] chemical detection kit to check for the presence of chemical warfare agents.[162] The operation ended at 5:15 p.m.. During the entire recovery operation, EOD members found no evidence of chemical warfare agents. On March 3, EOD personnel loaded the disarmed warhead (Figure 11) onto a barge for shipment back to the EOD base camp in Al Jubayl. Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Command personnel took custody of the warhead on March 8 and shipped the missile components to the Army Missile Command in Huntsville, Alabama.

Figure 11.  The recovered Scud's warhead

2. Summary of Findings of the Scud Impact Event

Despite eyewitness accounts that a Patriot missile shot down the Scud on February 16, the Patriot battery at Al Jubayl was not operational at the time and could not have shot it down.[163] The Scud did not detonate upon impact with the water, and it did not cause any personnel injuries or equipment damage. During the recovery operation, EOD personnel routinely tested for the presence of chemical warfare agents and found none. Testing of the missile’s warhead, recovered from the harbor, revealed high explosives and not chemical warfare agents.

On March 19, 1991, following the cease-fire, Seabees from NMCB-24 at Camp 13 required medical attention after exposure to unidentified airborne noxious fumes. These fumes caused acute symptoms such as burning throats, eyes, and noses, and difficulty in breathing. In addition, portions of the Seabees’ brown T-shirts that were damp with sweat turned purple.[164] Besides T-shirts changing colors, portions of some of these same Seabees’ combat boots also turned purple.[165]

The incident occurred at approximately 2:15 p.m. and involved three separate groups of NMCB-24 personnel. Five individuals working on equipment in the Alpha Yard (a motor pool located adjacent to Camp 13) comprised the first group.[166] Group 2 consisted of two medical personnel who were emptying sandbags inside Camp 13.[167] The third group, identified during an interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, comprised two other NMCB-24 personnel.[168] The two Seabees in the third group experienced the same symptoms as the Seabees in the other groups but did not report it to the safety officer and did not report to the medical department for treatment. We interviewed both individuals and found that one could not remember the incident[169] and the other remembered donning his mask and continuing to work.[170,171] A line connecting the positions of the three groups runs roughly north to south as shown in Figure 12. The separation of each group from the adjacent group was about 250 meters for a total spread of about 500 meters from north to south.

Figure 12.  Purple T-shirt groups

The affected Seabees stated that they experienced a choking sensation when a noxious cloud enveloped them. None of them saw the origin of the gas cloud, but all believed the cloud came from one of the industrial plants located near Camp 13, as shown in Figure 13. Descriptions of the odor that existed at the time of the incident identify chlorine, battery acid, nitric acid, or methyl ethyl ketone as possible substance.[172] All experienced the same symptoms and all of their T-shirts changed color. According to one Seabee, "the areas of our T-shirts that were soaked with sweat slowly began to turn the most beautiful shade of purple I ever saw."[173] The Seabees, except for those in the northern group, immediately sought medical attention and, after showering and changing clothes, returned to work with no further symptoms.[174]

Figure 13.  Camp 13 and surrounding industries

None of the Seabees exposed to the noxious gas cloud saw where it came from. However, a master chief equipment operator from NMCB-24 witnessed the event and has positively identified the source of the noxious cloud. On the day in question, he was working at a site north of Al Jubayl, but returned to Camp 13 to check on broken-down equipment. Immediately after stepping out of his vehicle at the Alpha yard, he saw purple dust falling everywhere. He could see it coming from a smokestack at the fertilizer plant. When the winds changed direction, the dust fell on him. There were nosebleeds and gagging among the exposed Seabees. Although NMCB-24 did store battery acid in the Alpha yard (a possible cause for nosebleeds and gagging), he did not recall a battery explosion at any time.[175]

We can not identify the specific plant or industrial complex that produced the noxious gas primarily because the wind direction at the time of the incident can not be accurately determined. Some of the Seabees who were involved in the incident said the winds were from the north, northwest, and the south.[176] In addition, the Center for Naval Analysis reported that in March, the prevailing winds in the Al Jubayl area are from the northwest 46 percent of the time.[177] If one of the fertilizer plants did produce the noxious gas, as reported by the master chief equipment operator, the winds would have to have come from the northeast. In our earlier discussion of the white cloud, we learned that the closest industrial complexes were located to the northeast of Camp 13 with one plant located as close as 500 meters. 

The U.S. Navy's Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 2 (EPMU-2) conducted an environmental/occupational hazard investigation and site visit of Al Jubayl in 1994. EPMU-2 personnel toured Camp 13 and local industries, and met with members of the Royal Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health and managers of the local industries. EPMU-2’s investigation noted that the Saudis monitored the air quality in Al Jubayl throughout Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS). Saudi government records indicate that the air quality of Al Jubayl was within acceptable limits throughout DS/DS; the records from Air Monitoring Station Number 1 (the air monitoring station closest to Camp 13) for March 19, 1991, reveal no release of chemical substances that exceeded normal acceptable parameters for this area (Tab F).[178]

The EPMU-2 investigation team identified three potential sources for the irritant involved in the purple T-shirt incident—ammonia from a fertilizer plant, hydrogen sulfide from a chemical plant, or unknown chemicals from other plants. The EPMU-2 team concluded that because the purple T-shirt event was a localized event and affected a small number of people, the most likely source for the irritant was a chemical spill within the motor pool area itself rather than an emission from one of the industrial plants.[179]

According to an NMCB-24 medical corpsman, testing of the T-shirts to determine what caused them to change color began shortly after the incident. Although no record exists, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24’s medical personnel recall that they collected the T-shirts, bagged them, and turned them over to a group of unnamed Marine officials. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 never received a written report of the analysis but learned via telephone that an exposure to ammonia caused the color change.[180] We have found no report or record of the in-country testing.<

In July 1993, the U.S. Army Material Test Directorate at the White Sands Missile Range tested a T-shirt to identify what caused the T-shirts to change color. We do not know the rationale for this test, the identity of the requesting agency,[181] or the T-shirt’s origin. The shirt reportedly had several small holes on its front and back. Although, we do not know the relevance of the small holes, we believe the T-shirt was similar in design (fabric and dyes) to the shirts available for wear during the Gulf War. Scientists used a scanning electron microscope to analyze the holes, but could not determine what caused the holes other than the damage appeared to be chemical in nature. In a similar study conducted in 1988, fabric exposed to various concentrations of sulfuric acid exhibited damage similar to the damaged fiber ends of the T-shirt tested in 1993.[182]

In 1994, the Natick Research Development and Engineering Center in Natick, Massachusetts conducted a third test at the request of the Defense Science Board. Natick analyzed T-shirts similar to those that turned purple at Camp 13. One of the NMCB-24 Seabees whose shirt turned purple furnished the T-shirts. We do not know whether Seabees wore these shirts during DS/DS. The tests showed that brown military T-shirts of the type worn during DS/DS do turn purple when exposed to acids, such as sulfuric (battery) acid and nitric/nitrous oxides from nitric acid.[183]

2. Summary of Findings of the Purple T-shirt Event

On March 19, 1991, after the cessation of hostilities, nine Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 encountered an unidentified noxious vapor while working at Camp 13. The exposure caused acute medical symptoms and caused portions of these individuals' T-shirts and combat boots to turn purple. Seven of the nine Seabees sought medical treatment, and after showering and changing their clothes, all seven returned to duty without further symptoms. The two Seabees who did not seek medical treatment simply continued to work, although they experienced the same acute symptoms as the others. According to the Seabees, after the incident, unnamed officials from the I Marine Expeditionary Force claimed the shirts and boots, and never returned them. Three separate post-war studies to determine the cause of the color changing agent have provided inconclusive other than to suggest a form of acid possibly caused the color change. An EPMU-2 study suggests that a chemical spill within the motor pool was the source of the irritant. However, a master chief equipment operator stated during an interview that he saw a purple substance coming from a fertilizer plant that was located near Camp 13.

1. Background

Beginning early in the deployment phase of Operation Desert Shield and continuing through the post-Gulf War period, military leaders expressed concern over the possibility of Coalition forces exposure to possibly hazardous environmental and industrial conditions within Al Jubayl. In the short-term, these conditions could have affected the immediate health and war fighting ability of Coalition forces, given that Al Jubayl was a major theater staging area that played a crucial role during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the longer-term, exposure to some of these dangerous environmental and industrial hazards in Al Jubayl could produce detrimental health effects to those individuals exposed.

This section will review the environmental conditions and industrial activities occurring during the period Coalition forces were in Al Jubayl; the potential sources of airborne contaminants; the regulatory history of the Al Jubayl industrial area; the results of other investigations into potential environmental and industrial conditions in Al Jubayl; the limitations and uncertainties in making an assessment of this sort; and the conclusions as to whether Coalition forces could have been exposed to hazardous environmental and industrial conditions within Al Jubayl. The purpose of this review is to determine, based on available data, if a gradual or sudden accidental release of toxic chemicals occurred; and second, could such a release have resulted in adverse health effects or caused the incidents observed at Camp 13.

2. Surrounding Land Use

Constructed on undeveloped property and consisting of operations and facilities related to Saudi Arabia’s petroleum resources, the industrial area of Al Jubayl (Figure 14) encompasses about 30 square miles a little over a mile west of the Persian Gulf. The strip of land between the industrial area and the Gulf contains temporary housing and other non-industrial facilities. Permanent housing is located a mile and a half north of the industrial area.[184]

Figure 14. Al Jubayl Industrial Area

Camp 13 (shown in the upper left quadrant of Figure 14) covers less than a half square mile in the north central portion of the industrial area of Al Jubayl. The motor pool area used by members of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 is located west of Camp 13 across a two-lane road. The motor pool area is open ground and extends a number of miles to the south and the west.[185]

3. Industrial Activities of Selected Industries Surrounding Camp 13

A number of industrial activities were close to Camp 13 (Table 5). We reviewed their potential to contribute sudden and catastrophic, as well as non-sudden and gradual releases of chemicals that could have adversely effected those who were exposed.[186]

Processes and operations associated with these industries involved the use of a number of toxic chemicals during the Gulf War deployment period. Most continued their normal operations and production schedules, but in earlier investigations, company officials stated that their companies made efforts to minimize their on-hand chemical inventory. In general, chemicals at these industries were stored in stainless steel tanks with a thickness of one and a half inches. The exception to this was anhydrous ammonia, located at the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company east of Camp 13, which was stored in double-walled tanks in order to provide more adequate insulation for the chemical.[187]

After considering all the potential airborne contaminant releases due to industrial activity around Camp 13, the Center for Naval Analysis concluded that the chemical threat was threefold: the threat from fires due to the burning of petroleum products; the threat from toxic gases such as anhydrous ammonia, a colorless toxic gas with a pungent odor, and chlorine, a green-yellow toxic gas with a pungent, suffocating odor; and the threat from hydrogen sulfide, a colorless flammable gas, produced from fires at oil wellheads and pipelines.[188]

4. Monitoring of Airborne Contaminants

Of seven air monitoring stations throughout Al Jubayl, monitoring station number one was nearest to Camp 13, but over a mile away. Like the rest of the monitoring stations, it continuously scanned for nine atmospheric contaminants: sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, three oxides of nitrogen, ozone, non-methane organic carbon, carbon monoxide, and inhalable suspended particulates.[190] The entirely automated process compiles data hourly, daily, and monthly. Additional information on environmental monitoring at Al Jubayl is included in Tab E. Monitoring data from station number one for the period of August 1990 to June 1991 is included in Tab F.

Data from monitoring station number one indicates that except for non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates, there were no unusually high levels of contaminants in the air near station number one. The US Navy’s Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2 attributed the elevated levels of non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates during January through April of 1991 to the Kuwait oil well fires.[191] However, station number one like the rest of the monitoring stations could only monitor the air near each station and could not detect elevated levels of contaminants outside of a station’s effective zone. In addition, wind could blow a contaminant away from a station and prevent it from detecting a higher level. Therefore, a spill or other event could have occurred at or near Camp 13 without detection by monitoring station number one. In addition, these monitoring stations tested for the nine specific chemicals identified in the preceding paragraph. For a leak or spill of a chemical other than one of the nine, the monitoring data would show that nothing unusual.

5. Environmental Regulatory History of Al Jubayl

Al Jubayl’s construction and development on previously unused desert land was fortuitous because from its origin, its industries had to adhere to strict environmental control and pollution standards set by the Saudi Royal Commission of Al Jubayl and Yanbu and the Saudi Meteorological and Environmental Protection Agency, the two entities that enforce environmental regulation in Al Jubayl. Permission to build and operate plants in Al Jubayl was contingent upon detailed pollution control measures. The Commission disqualified several companies because they could not meet the rigorous environmental standards. In recognition of Al Jubayl’s successful environmental programs, the Royal Commission of Al Jubayl and Yanbu received the United Nations’ Sasakawa Award in 1988.[192]

Companies in Al Jubayl have well planned and established environmental monitoring systems, advanced laboratory equipment, and highly educated staffs. They maintain monitoring records have contaminant capturing or filtration devices at release points.[193] Monitoring station data indicates no chemical leaks or spills during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm period. Since Saudi Arabia strictly applies environmental regulations to the industries of Al Jubayl, it is unlikely environmental monitoring officials overlooked a sudden or gradual release at levels affecting the health of Coalition forces.

6. Results of Other Investigations

Two other investigations have examined the threat of hazardous environmental conditions in Al Jubayl to Coalition forces.

A November 1990 report by the Center for Naval Analyses for the I Marine Expeditionary Force entitled, "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area,"[194] examined the hazards to various military installations in the event of an accident or an attack on the industrial facilities of Al Jubayl. Under a number of different modeling scenarios, the Center prepared estimates to assess the degree of the resultant damage to military facilities and the ensuing chemical releases.

The report concluded the industrial hazards in Al Jubayl were: a threat from fires due to the ignition of petroleum products; a threat from toxic gases such as ammonia and chlorine; and a threat of hydrogen sulfide and fire from the oil wellheads and pipelines. Specifically, the threat of a toxic gas release would depend on wind direction and speed, the temperature, precipitation levels, humidity, as well as the time of day the release occurred.[195]

A second report by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2,[196] completed in January of 1995, examined possible environmental agents that could have caused a cloud of an unknown origin to irritate the eyes, noses, and throats of several members of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, as well as cause portions of some of their T-shirts and boots to change the color of purple. Interviewers questioned members of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu, largely members of the health service department concerned with monitoring health and environmental quality, as well as representatives of selected industries surrounding Camp 13. On most occasions, interviewers took short tours of the facilities of industries selected based on interviews with members of NMCB-24 or representative of industries that might release industrial pollutants around Camp 13.[197]

This EPMU-2 report came to a number of conclusions:

• Al Jubayl enforced environmental control standards equal to or exceeding standards found in the United States.
• Air monitoring during the year of DS/DS revealed concentrations of seven of nine monitored pollutants were within the US Environmental Protection Agency’s standards. Non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates were slightly elevated in January through April of 1991 due to the Kuwait oil well fires. We know of no known health risks associated with these levels.
• The land used for Camp 13 and the adjacent motor pool is not, nor was it ever, contaminated.
• Three potential emission sources—ammonia from the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company, hydrogen sulfide from Petromin Shell, and unknown chemicals from other industrial plants east and south of Camp 13—might have been responsible for symptoms experienced by some of the members of NMCB- 24. However, given the distances from these sources to the motor pool and the prevailing wind direction, any such emissions would have spread out and affected a large number of people over a wide area rather than targeting individuals within the motor pool while sparing individuals inside Camp 13.
• The monitoring system would likely have detected emissions of hydrogen sulfide, sulfuric acid, or nitric acid.
• Given the narrow area where Seabees experience symptoms and the small number of people involved, the event may have been due to a small, localized spill of an unknown chemical within the motor pool.

7. Conclusions Regarding Environmental Factors at Al Jubayl

From an examination of the limited data available on the environmental conditions of Al Jubayl, as well as previous environmental assessments of Al Jubayl, and a number of interviews with Gulf War veterans, we reached some conclusions.

• A catastrophic release of a toxic chemical probably did not occur. Monitoring data and records of emergency response incidents likely would have captured such an event. Furthermore, such a release would have affected a relatively wide geographic area with severe and immediate health effects, but there were no reports.
• Monitoring stations might not have picked up a modest localized chemical leak or even a relatively large-scale chemical release due to a number of factors, including weather conditions, such as wind direction and speed, distance from the monitoring station, or limitations on what chemicals are sampled.
• We accepted the data regarding the manufacturing processes and chemical holdings of industries in Al Jubayl detailed in the reports by the Center for Naval Analyses (for the I Marine Expeditionary Force) and the US Navy’s Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2. Other than air monitoring data taken from August 1990 to July 1991, there were no independent, corroborating, environmental assessment data.
• Conducting a detailed examination of plant records, including accident, spill, and disposal reports; a thorough on-site inspection and walk through to verify information received as well as to observe site conditions first-hand; and an inventory of the above ground and below ground holding tanks would have improved the results of the previously cited investigations. [198]
• A myriad of environmental events on Jan. 19, 1991, could have produced the reports of a cloud or mist sighting by the members of NMCB-24 during the loud noise incident. These events range from weather phenomenon to steam escaping from grates.
• Because the area immediately surrounding Camp 13 contains heavy industrial activity, a sudden and accidental or non-sudden and gradual chemical release may have occurred and caused the symptoms experienced by members of NMCB-24.
• The motor pool adjacent to Camp 13 would have contained an assortment of fuels, greases, oils, solvents, and countless other chemicals. It is possible that a leak or spill of one of these items also could have caused the symptoms experienced by members of NMCB-24.
• Because of the absence of monitoring data for the Camp 13 area, it is not possible to make a definitive statement as to whether releases occurred. The issue is further confounded by the few individuals affected, and the rapid abatement of their symptoms. Ultimately, there is no data available to confirm or refute the occurrence of a release of toxic or hazardous chemicals.

Members of the NMCB-24, the subjects of several studies and reports, were among the first veterans to report unexplained illnesses following the Gulf War. In a survey of NMCB-24 Seabees conducted in 1993-1994 by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, members from this unit reported a variety of symptoms but the Navy found no pattern of illness. Diagnosed diseases appeared to be normal for a group of that age.[199]

In a post-war study of Gulf War veterans, scientists at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center studied 249 survey participants of the 606 Gulf War veterans of NMCB-24 and found that 70% reported serious illnesses since returning from the war. Using factor analysis of symptoms reported by these individuals, the authors concluded that there were six distinct groups of symptoms in 63 of the individuals, and that these appeared to be related to neurological injury.[200] Neurological and psychological testing of 23 individuals from these groups showed subtle abnormalities,[201] which the authors linked to self-reported exposures to toxic chemical combinations.[202] More recently, these researchers have reported that there may be genetic susceptibilities to illness[203] and vestibular dysfunction[204] in the symptomatic individuals, but the number of individuals studied is small and the work will need to be confirmed in larger numbers of individuals.

A second study of 1,497 Seabees who served during the Gulf War period (527 Gulf War veterans and 970 non-deployed veterans) found that deployed Seabees reported substantially more symptoms and exposures than non-deployed Seabees and had more psychological symptoms and difficulties.[205] Ninety-six of these individuals (64 Gulf War veterans and 32 non-deployed veterans) were tested for antibody to the bacteria Mycoplasma fermentans (as a marker of the infection suggested by some to contribute to veterans’ illnesses), but there were no differences between the groups.[206] Data extracted from this ongoing national study did show that Seabees from NMCB-24 were more likely to report symptoms than Seabees from NMCB-40, an active duty unit that was collocated with NMCB-24 in Al Jubayl during the Gulf War, but substantial differences in the demographics, exposures, and news media attention make meaningful comparisons difficult.[207] The larger Seabee health study will take some years to complete, but may offer additional comparisons of importance between deployed and non-deployed Seabees, and perhaps between specific deployed units.

Although the purposes for conducting a military attack or a terrorist attack differ, the results have similarities—people get injured or killed, and damage occurs. It is understandable why some veterans believe that an attack occurred. Months of preparing for war coupled with repeated official and unofficial reports of Iraq’s war fighting capability instilled serious concerns for servicemembers by the time the air war began on Jan. 17, 1991. Actually going to war intensified everyone’s awareness of the danger. Therefore, when people in Al Jubayl heard the loud noise, the natural reaction was to assume an attack. However, of the many interviews of persons in Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991, no veteran reported firsthand knowledge of damage or injuries. During our investigation, we looked hard for any injury or damage, but found none. We identified the source of the loud noise as sonic booms and verified that no enemy aircraft flew in Coalition airspace. Due to the absence of information to prove otherwise, we have assessed that an Iraqi military attack or terrorist attack definitely was not the cause of the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. Although this may answer the loud noise question, it does not answer questions regarding the cause of the bright flash, white cloud, and burning skin. It is to these incidents that we now turn our attention.

There may be no such thing as a normal investigation, but a common approach is to collect physical or documentary evidence and look backwards for what may have caused a particular event or incident. In the case of the bright flash, white cloud, and burning skin there is no physical evidence to analyze and the scant amount of documentary evidence on any one of the incidents makes it impossible to pinpoint specific sources. Our approach was to view the incidents as if they actually happened, and then look for the results that should have occurred. For example, some veterans believe a Scud missile or the intercept of a Scud by a Patriot missile caused the bright flash. Because there is no record of damage or injures resulting from an attack on January 19, and no reported missile impact point, we had to look elsewhere for information to determine what may have caused the flash. Information of Scud launches compiled during the war shows with near certainty that Iraq launched no Scud missiles towards Saudi Arabia on January 19. We also know that it would have been highly unlikely for a Scud launch to go undetected. Next, we looked at the data compiled on the Patriot missile. We found that none of the Patriot missile batteries located in Saudi Arabia fired a missile on January 19; in fact, the battery located in Al Jubayl did not fire a single missile during the entire war. We also explored other possibilities for the bright flash such as a fiery aircraft crash or some type of industrial accident, but found no record of any such event. The only other explanations we have for the bright flash are the use of flares. The UK MOD’s report includes an explanation that one of their units had fired a maroon (a flare like signaling device) during the period of the loud noise. In addition to the MOD’s report, one US veteran reported seeing a flare fired from the USS Tarawa presumably at the time the loud noise event occurred. However, neither of these explanations is definitive. We do not believe the cause of the bright flash was malicious or was a threat to any personnel. Therefore, we list the cause for the bright flash as indeterminate.

The white cloud incident was more difficult to assess than the bright flash because of nearly a complete lack of evidence. Except for one entry in a Camp 13 security log and another entry in the RAOC log, there is no other record of the event in US documents. The UK MOD’s report also contains a discussion of a cloud sighting. However, because of the lack of information regarding the incident we can not determine if the UK sightings and US are of the same cloud. Although we believe weather related factors or industrial operations caused the cloud, we can not identify what actually caused the cloud to appear. Therefore, we list the cause for the white cloud as indeterminate.

The last issue in our investigation and analyses of incidents that occurred on Jan. 19, 1991 is reports that some NMCB-24 Seabees experienced a burning sensation on their skin during the time of the loud noise. Some Seabees point to the incidence of burning skin as further proof of an attack with chemical warfare agents. However, reports of burning skin are small in number and the phenomenon appears only to have affected a small number of NMCB-24 Seabees.

It appears that at the time of the incident, the Seabees who experienced the burning sensation felt that their condition was not serious enough to warrant medical attention because there is no record that any of the Seabees who experienced the burning skin reported to a medical facility for treatment. The only other evidence available to us is that several people reported smelling ammonia at the time of the loud noise. We have not found any record to indicate there was an ammonia release from a plant in Al Jubayl. Although ammonia can cause burns, its unique odor is not associated with any chemical warfare agent. Although the cause for the burning skin can not be identified, we believe that chemical warfare agents did not cause some of the NMCB-24 Seabees to experience a burning sensation on their skin. Therefore, we list the cause for the burning skin as indeterminate.

There are many facets to the loud noise event of Jan. 19, 1991. Even though we have assessed that the loud noise event of January 19 event was not caused by Iraqi military or terrorist action, we can not definitively identify what caused the bright flash, white cloud and burning skin. Therefore, our assessment as to whether chemical warfare agents were present in Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991 continues to be unlikely.

The loud noise event of January 20-21 appears mild when compared to the events of January 19. There are no reports of white clouds; there are no reports of burning skin; and there are nor reports of bright flashes. The only event recorded in logs was the sound of explosion-like noises. We have confirmed the launching of several Scud missiles at approximately the same time as the events recorded in unit logs. The Scuds could have created the explosion-like noises as they flew over Al Jubayl on their way to Dhahran. The CENTOCM NBC log noted that Patriot missiles destroyed the Scuds. We know however, that the Patriot battery in Al Jubayl never fired a missile during the war. This means that a Patriot battery located outside of Al Jubayl, most likely the battery in Dhahran, engaged and destroyed the Scud missiles. It is unlikely that people in Al Jubayl could hear or see a Patriot intercept of a Scud missile that took place outside of Dhahran. Based upon available information, we have assessed that the events of Jan. 20-21, 1991 definitely did not involve an attack upon Al Jubayl and that chemical warfare agents were definitely not present.

Initially, this event received a considerable amount of attention. However, the initial surge of interest diminished over time because no personnel injuries and no equipment damage occurred as a result of the missile’s impact. Based on the information that is available to date, our assessment is that the Scud missile was definitely not armed with chemical warfare agents. We base our assessment upon the following information:

• The warhead was found to contain high explosives; and,
• Testing conducted for the presence of chemical warfare agents during recovery operations yielded negative results.

Our assessment is that chemical warfare agents were definitely not present at Camp 13 or at the motor pool (alpha yard) during the purple T-shirt event and that chemical warfare agents definitely did not cause the Seabees’ T-shirts to change color. We base this assessment on the following:

• This event occurred after the cessation of hostilities and we found no record of a hostile attack after the war ended;
• We found no records to indicate that any chemical warfare agents (CWAs) were suspected as the cause of the purple T-shirt incident nor did we find any record that testing for the presence of CWAs was conducted at Camp 13;
• Those overcome by the unidentified noxious fumes recovered after showering and changing clothes and had no symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical warfare agents; and,
• Testing on similar T-shirts after the war ended indicates that chemical warfare agents did not cause the T-shirts to change color.

In addition to conducting investigations and veterans outreach, the Office of Special Assistant is working to assure future force protection by recommending changes in equipment, policies, and procedures. During an investigation such as this, accurate records are essential sources of information. Unlike a person’s memory that fades over time, official documents do not lose the information they contain. At the end of the war, units packed up their supplies and equipment and returned home. Some units undoubtedly destroyed records in the process. Some units kept records on file for varying periods, but destroyed them because they needed the space for more current records, or because they no longer had the manpower to maintain the records. The resulting information gaps have had a negative influence on this office’s findings and assessments. Ironically, when our reports highlight the absence of information, critics of the DOD use these information lapses to argue that the DOD is withholding information. To prevent information losses in the future, the DOD should develop procedures that will ensure retention of records created during special periods (e.g., the Gulf War). These procedures should assign responsibilities, identify which categories of information require retention (e.g., operations, intelligence, maintenance, etc), and establish the procedures and timelines for archiving these documents.

This case is still under investigation. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please call 1-800-497-6261.

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CWA chemical warfare agent

DOD Department of Defense

DS/DS Desert Shield/Desert Storm

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPMU-2 Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number Two

FMA Force Management Area

HQ headquarters

IFF Identification, Friend or Foe

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

KAANB King Abdul Aziz Naval Base

MAW Marine Air Wing

MOD United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

NMCB Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NAF Naval Air Facility

OIC officer-in-charge

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

PSU Port Security Unit

RAOC Rear Area Operations Center

SIF Selective Identification Feature

UDATS Underwater Damage Assessment Television System

UIC Unit Identification Code

UK  United Kingdom

US United States

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

AC

hydrogen cyanide, a blood agent

Blister agent

Also known as a vesicant, a blister agent is a chemical warfare agent which produces local irritation and damage to the skin and mucous membranes, pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the respiratory tract. Blister agents include mustards (HD and HN) and an arsenical mustard (L). Although phosgene oxime (CX) is not a blister agent, it is treated as one in the operation of the M256 kit. Phosgene oxime is more correctly referred to as an urticant.

Blood agent

A chemical warfare agent that is inhaled and absorbed into the blood. The blood carries the agent to all body tissues where it interferes with the tissue oxygenation process. The brain is especially effected. The effect on the brain leads to cessation of respiration followed by cardiovascular collapse. Examples of blood agents are AC and CK.

Chemical warfare agent

A chemical substance used in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans (or animals) through its toxicological effects. Excluded are riot control agents, chemical herbicides, and smoke and flame materials. Chemical agents include nerve agents, incapacitating agents, blister agents (vesicants), lung damaging agents, blood agents, and vomiting agents.

CK

Cyanogen chloride, a blood agent.

Condition black

The highest level of alert, condition black refers to the strongest defensive actions a unit takes in response to a perceived chemical weapon attack.

CS

Tear gas. Chemical name: O-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile.

CX

Phosgene oxime (see urticant and blister agent).

Detection paper

Detection paper relies on certain dyes being soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are mixed with cellulose fibers in unbleached paper (a without special coloring). When the paper absorbs a drop of CWA, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow. In addition, VX (a form of liquid nerve agent) causes the indicator to turn to blue that, together with the yellow, will become green/green-black.

Detection paper can be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, they should not be located in places where drops of substances such as solvent, fat, oil, or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water produce no reaction.

Depending on the spot diameter and density on the detection paper, it is possible to gauge the original size of the droplets and the degree of contamination.

Dusty Chemical Warfare Agent

A chemical warfare agent (CWA) that is dispersed in aerosol form is referred to as a dusty agent. A dusty agent results from a process in which a chemical warfare agent is absorbed onto a to a very small particle, e.g., silica. The particle then becomes a carrier for the chemical warfare agent. The small size of the carrier allows it to penetrate some types of clothing, including protective clothing. Injuries sustained from exposure to a dusty agent are the same as those received from exposure to other forms of mustard agent.

Dyspnea

Shortness of breath, a subjective difficulty or distress in breathing, usually associated with disease of the heart or lungs; occurs normally during intense physical exertion or at high altitude.

Edema

An accumulation of an excessive amount of watery fluid in cells, tissues, or serous cavities.

Epistaxis

Profuse bleeding from the nose, nosebleed.

Erythema

Redness of the skin due to capillary dilatation.

GA

Tabun nerve agent. Chemical name: Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate.

GB

Sarin-nerve agent Chemical name: Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate.

GD

Soman nerve agent, Chemical name: Pinacoly methyl phosphonofluoridate.

General quarters

A condition of readiness when naval action is imminent. All battle stations are fully manned and alert; ammunition is ready for instant loading; guns and guided missile launchers may be loaded.

GF

Cyclosarin nerve agent Chemical Name: O-Cyclohexyl-methylfluorophosphonate or cyclohexyl methylphosphonoflouridate.

H

H-series blister agents: A series of persistent blister agents, that include Levinstein (Sulfur) Mustards (H), Distilled Mustard (HD), Nitrogen Mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3), and Mustard-Lewisite Mixture.

HD

Distilled mustard, a blister agent.

Hyperapnea

Breathing that is deeper and more rapid than is normal at rest.

L

Lewisite, a blister agent Chemical Name: Dichloro-(2-chlorovinyl)arsine

Miosis

Contraction of the pupil.

Mission Oriented Protective Posture

A flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask to balance mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides individuals protection against all known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins. MOPP Level 0 requires individuals to carry their protective mask; personnel in MOPP Level 4 wear all MOPP gear. MOPP gear consists of the following items: chemical suit, overboots, butyl rubber gloves, and protective mask with hood.

M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit

The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of chemical agent. The M256 kit is used after a chemical attack to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.

Nerve agents

The most toxic chemical warfare agents. Nerve agents are absorbed into the body through breathing, by injection, or absorption through the skin. They affect the nervous and the respiratory systems and various body functions. They include the G series and V series chemical warfare agents.

OSA fast patrol boats

OSA fast patrol boats are Russian-made naval vessels used for coastal patrol and defense. These boats were produced in two classes: class I and class II. Missiles are the OSA’s primary weapon system. The boat is 110.2 feet long, 24.9 feet high, 8.8 feet wide, and displaces 210 tons. It is powered by three diesel engines. The boat’s top speed is 35 to 37 knots. Its range depends on class (I or II) and speed. A class I boat can travel 400 miles at 34 knots while class II boats can travel 500 miles at 35 knots. Iraq was one of several nations to import OSA patrol boats.

Rhinorrhea

A discharge from the nasal mucous membrane.

Temperature inversion

A temperature inversion is a meteorological condition in which a layer of warm air traps a cooler layer of air beneath it. This prevents pollutants and other airborne substances from escaping into the atmosphere

Universal Transverse Mercator Grid (UTM)

UTM is a coordinate system used for creating maps. The UTM system projects a series of intersecting grid lines on the Earth's surface, extending from 84 degrees north to 80 degrees south latitudes. Also called UTM Grid.

V

V-series agents are persistent, highly toxic nerve agents developed in the mid-1950s and absorbed primarily through the skin. V-series agents are generally odorless liquids that do not evaporate rapidly. The standard V agent is VX.

Vesiculation

The formation of vesicles. Synonym: blistering, vesication.

Vestibular dysfunction

Abnormal function, impaired function, or other disturbance of the vestibular system. The vestibular system consists of the three semicircular canals which sense and transduce angular acceleration; and the otolithic apparatus which senses and transduces linear acceleration and static gravitational forces, the latter providing a sense of head position in space. The vestibular system is one of three sensory systems, which subserve spatial orientation and posture. (The others are the visual system and the somatosensory system which conveys peripheral information from the skin, joints, and muscles.) When there is disturbance of the vestibular system, the following may result:

Vertigo - a hallucination of self- or environmental movement, most commonly a feeling of spinning. It is frequently accompanied by nausea, nystagmus (rapid eye movements in one direction), postural unsteadiness, and gait ataxia (unsteadiness or uncoordination). Since vertigo increases with rapid head movements, patients tend to hold their heads still.

Acute unilateral dysfunction may be caused by infection, trauma, and insufficient blood flow. Often no specific etiology is uncovered.

Acute bilateral layrinthine dysfunction is usually the result of toxins such as drugs or alcohol. The most common offending drugs are aminoglycoside antibiotics.

VX

V-series nerve agent. Chemical Name: O-ethyl-S-(2-isopropylaminoethyl)methyl phosphonothiolate.

I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991.

1^st Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group, Significant Events Report, February 21, 1991.

3^d Battalion, 24^th Marines, Watch Log (Extract), January 19, 1991.

24^th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 18-19, 1991.

552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," undated.

552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," December 1998.

552d Air Control Wing, Letter, Subject: "Report on Replays Conducted for the SECDEF Request for Assistance," February 2, 1998.

552d Computer Group Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," undated.

Baskin, Steven J., and Thomas G. Brewer, "Cyanide Poisoning," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997

Berg SW, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, "Post Persian Gulf Medical Findings in Military Reservists," Report presented to NIH Technology Assessment Conference on the Persian Gulf Experience and Health, Bethesda MD, April 1994 and to the Institute of Medicine Committee to Review the Consequences of Service during the Gulf War.

British Liaison Officer (Gulf Health), Letter, July 9, 1998.

Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995.

Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)" (SECRET), August 1996.

Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990

Central Intelligence Agency, E-mail message, Subject: "Questions Related to Al Jubayl," July 21, 2000, @ 5:05 PM.

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The Department of Defense (DOD) requires a common framework for our investigations and assessments of chemical warfare agent reports, so we turned to the United Nations and the international community, which had chemical weapons experience (e.g., the United Nations’ investigation of the chemical weapons used during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war). Because the modern battlefield is complex, the international community developed investigative and validation procedures[138] to provide objective information about possible chemical weapons incidents. Based on these international procedures and guidelines, our methodology includes these factors:

• A detailed written record of the conditions at the site;
• Physical evidence from the site, e.g., weapons fragments and soil, water, vegetation, human, or animal tissue samples;
• A record of the chain of custody during transportation of the evidence;
• Testimony of witnesses;
• Several analyses; and
• A review of the evidence by an expert panel.

While we base our investigation methodology (Figure 11) on these procedures, the passage of time since the Gulf War makes it difficult to obtain certain types of documentary evidence, and physical evidence often was not collected when an event occurred. Therefore, we cannot apply a rigid template to all incidents and must tailor each investigation to its unique circumstances. Accordingly, we designed our methodology to provide a thorough investigative process to define each incident's circumstances and determine what happened. Our methodology's major efforts are:

• To substantiate the incident;
• To document available medical reports about the incident;
• To interview appropriate people;
• To obtain information available to external organizations; and
• To assess the results

Figure 15. Chemical warfare incident investigation methodology

A case usually starts with a report of a possible chemical warfare agent incident, often from a veteran. To substantiate the circumstances surrounding an incident, the investigator searches operational, intelligence, and environmental logs for documentation. This focuses the investigation on a specific time, date, and location, clarifies the conditions under which the incident occurred, and determines whether there is "hard," as well as anecdotal, evidence.

Alarms alone are not certain evidence of chemical warfare agent presence, nor is a single observation sufficient to validate a chemical warfare agent's presence. The investigator looks for physical evidence collected at the time of the incident possibly indicating whether chemical agents were present in its vicinity. Such evidence might include tissue samples, body fluid samples, clothing, environmental samples of soil or vegetation, weapons parts, and Fox MM-1 tapes with properly documented spectrums.

The investigator searches available medical records to determine if the incident injured anyone and notes deaths, injuries, sicknesses, etc., near an incident's time and location. We ask medical experts to asked to provide information about any possible chemical warfare agent casualties.

We interview those involved in or near the incident (participants or witnesses). First-hand witnesses provide valuable insight into the conditions surrounding the incident and the mind-set of those involved, and are particularly important if physical evidence is lacking. We interview nuclear, biological, and chemical officers or specialists trained in chemical testing, confirmation, and reporting to identify the unit’s response, tests conducted, injuries sustained, and reports submitted. We contact commanders to ascertain what they knew, what decisions they made about the events surrounding the incident, and their assessment of it. If appropriate, subject matter experts provide opinions on the capabilities, limitations, and operation of technical equipment and evaluate selected topics of interest.

Additionally, the investigator contacts agencies and organizations that may be able to further clarify details of the case, including, but not limited to:

• Intelligence agencies that might be able to provide insight into events leading to the event, imagery of the area of the incident, and assessments of factors affecting the case;
• The clinical registries of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs which may provide data about the medical condition of those involved in the incident; and
• Agencies capable of computer modeling meteorological and source characterization data in cases in which we suspect airborne dispersion of agent.

Once the investigation is complete, the investigator evaluates the available evidence to assess it objectively. The available evidence is often incomplete or contradictory, so we must looked at it in the total context of what we know about the incident. Physical evidence collected when the incident occurred, for example, can be tremendously valuable to an investigation. We generally would give properly documented physical evidence the greatest weight in any assessment. The testimony of witnesses and contemporaneous operational documentation also is significant when making an assessment. Testimony from witnesses who also happen to be subject matter experts is usually more meaningful than testimony from untrained observers. Typically, we give secondhand accounts less weight than witnesses' testimony. If witnesses' accounts conflict, investigators look for other information supporting the witnesses' statements. Investigators evaluate the supporting information to determine how it corroborates any conflicting position. Generally, such supporting information will fit into a pattern corroborating one of the conflicting accounts of the incident over the others. Where the bulk of corroborating evidence supports one witness more than another, that person's information would be considered more compelling.

In each investigation our assessment relies on the investigator’s evaluation of the available information. Because we do not expect to always have conclusive evidence, we have developed an assessment scale (Figure 12) ranging from Definitely Not to Definitely, with intermediate assessments of Unlikely, Indeterminate, and Likely. The investigator uses this scale to make an assessment, which is our best judgment, based on facts available on the report publication date; we reassess each case over time based on new information and feedback.

Figure 16. Assessment of chemical warfare agent presence

The standard for making the assessment is common sense: do the available facts lead a reasonable person to conclude that chemical warfare agents were present or not? If insufficient information is available, the assessment is Indeterminate until more evidence emerges.

Eight remote sensor stations monitored the air quality within the vicinity of Al Jubayl—seven stations located at various locations within Al Jubayl and the eighth monitoring station at KAANB. A mobile monitoring unit was also available. Figure 17 shows monitoring stations located within the immediate industrial area and port area during the war. The fixed stations had an equipment trailer and a sampling tower surrounded by a security fence. Each sampling tower had sensors installed at heights of 10, 50, and 90 meters (33, 164, and 296 feet respectively). The automated monitoring process relied on sensor data fed to on-site computers and transmitted to a central monitoring station every five minutes. Compiled on an hourly, daily, monthly, and yearly basis, the sensor data was compared to the Royal Commission’s standards.

Figure 17. Location of Air Quality Monitor Stations within the Industrial Area

Monitors were capable of detecting the following pollutants:

• Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂)
• Hydrogen Sulfide (H₂S)
• three different oxides of Nitrogen (NO), (NO₂), and (NOX)
• Ozone (O₃)
• Non Methane organic carbons (NMOC)
• Carbon Monoxide (CO)
• Inhalable Suspended Particulates (ISP PM10)
• Lead (monitoring for Lead began after Desert Storm).

The sensors could only detect industrial pollutants and could not detect chemical warfare agents. All fixed sensor-monitoring stations were operational throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As stated previously, Air Monitoring Station Number one was located 2 kilometers west of Camp 13. Tab F contains Monitoring Station Number one readings from August 1990 through June 1991 provided by the Royal Commission. The data shows no large-scale release of industrial chemicals or pollutants in the area near Camp 13.[245]

The water quality monitoring used a system of ten strategically placed monitoring stations. The Royal Commission established water quality standards that paralleled those of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Water quality monitoring included checking the water for total organic content, temperature, pH, total dissolved solids, and industry-specific pollutants. Wastewater was treated at either an industrial waste treatment plant or a sewage waste treatment plant, as appropriate. Proper treatment brought sanitary wastewater to a level that approached the quality of potable water for irrigation purposes.[246]

Environmental Survey Program

Jubail Industrial Complex
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Monthly AQ Summary
Final Data

Figure 18. British forces units in Al Jubayl

Regarding this case narrative about three significant events occurring in the Al Jubayl area during the Persian Gulf War, OSAGWI concluded that the presence of chemical warfare agents was ‘unlikely’ for one of the events and ‘definitely did not occur’ in the remaining two. We believe that the available evidence generally supports OSAGWI's assessment, but OSAGWI is still performing work regarding alternate explanations for some events affecting this case. However, we also found that OSAGWI did not include important information in this case narrative regarding the unusually high levels of post-war veterans' complaints of medical symptoms they associated with the incidents involved in this case. Furthermore, OSAGWI did not adequately identify and coordinate some of this information that could potentially provide evidence to help resolve research questions concerning whether there is a correlation between high levels of reported Gulf War illnesses symptoms and duty during the Gulf War at Al Jubayl.[250] …

We believe that the case narrative is not complete and could be misleading because it does not mention the fact that many members of NMCB-24 have reported unusually high levels of health problems since their service in the Persian Gulf War. We also found that OSAGWI had not coordinated some information developed during this investigation with the Naval Health Research Center for inclusion in its Gulf War illnesses research on Seabees.[251]

We agreed to modify the Al Jubayl case narrative to place the events of this incident in fuller context to include that some service members stationed at Al Jubayl, especially members of NMCB-24, have reported high levels of health problems. We also agreed to request that the Naval Health Research Center undertake an analytical comparison regarding NMCB-24 and NMCB-40, and that independent reviewers are critical to a thorough and acceptable report on our investigations.

The new information came from two sources. The first source was two individuals who met with us to discuss the original finding and assessment of the loud noise event. During the meeting, which occurred on Sept. 5, 1997, the two individuals presented two different scenarios that challenged the assessment of the loud noise event. They believed that Iraq's military action caused the loud noise and not sonic booms from Coalition aircraft, as originally reported in the case narrative. The second source of information was the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD). On Jan. 17, 2000, the MOD published the findings of its investigation into the loud noise event, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl on Jan. 19, 1991." Although the MOD’s assessment is similar to ours, the MOD’s narrative contains new information not covered in our original Al Jubayl case narrative.

Besides obtaining new information, comments made by the General Accounting Office concerning the narrative also necessitate an update to the narrative. While agreeing with the assessments made in the narrative, the GAO criticized the narrative because it did not address the medical problems some veterans, many of whom were assigned to NMCB-24, have endured since returning home from the Gulf. The GAO recommended including this information in any update to the narrative.

The changes made to the paper are:

• The rewritten narrative reflects the updated methodology and footnoting standards of the Office of the Special Assistant;
• The rewritten narrative discusses our investigation into the alleged aircraft attack and Styx missile attack;
• The rewritten narrative now identifies the warhead contents of the Scud missile that impacted in Al Jubayl harbor;
• References to new source documents enhance the narrative’s accuracy;
• A medical issues section addresses the medical problems of Gulf War veterans; and,
• The rewritten environmental section provides a more detailed discussion of Al Jubayl’s environment.

1. An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.
2. Different spellings of Al Jubayl can be found in numerous official and unofficial documents (e.g., Al Jubayi, Al Jubail, or Jubail). For clarity, Al Jubayl is used in this document.
3. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia" (Case Narrative,) August 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/aljubayl (as of August 5, 2000).
4. Lead Report 6494, Notes of meeting held between OSAGWI investigators and two concerned individuals, September 5, 1997.
5. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 7.
6. There are many sources available to obtain information on chemical warfare agents. One source that is available from the World Wide Web is a site that is maintained by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, web site www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/chemhome.htm (as of August 5, 2000). Located in The Hague, the Netherlands, this organization is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.
7. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 1, 5.
8. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 37, and Annex B, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
9. A list of units that were located in Al Jubayl is at Tab B.
10. US Coast Guard, Chronology of the US Coast Guard's Involvement in the Persian Gulf War, web site www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/PersianGulfChron.html (as of August 5, 2000); Lead Report 5169, Interview of the commander of Port Security Unit 301-B, May 27, 1997, p. 1, 2.
11. Report to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 60-67.
12. Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.
13. Lead Report 1097, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2.
14. Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2.
15. Interviews of NMCB-24 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) reaction team members about the use of M-8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarms conflict with each other. The NBC officer stated that the alarms did not go off but that they were working properly (Lead Report 1104, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC watch officer, October 26, 1996, p. 2). Another NBC team member stated that the alarms were not operational because information contained in a manual indicated that the alarm was not effective in a desert environment (Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2)."
16. All times reflect local time unless indicated otherwise.
17. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19-21, 1991, entry 0332 January 19,1991; 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, Watch Log, entry 0330 January 19, 1991, p. 15.
18. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entries 0338 and 0345 on January 19, 1991.
19. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0501. This entry is most likely a result of information received from the Rear Area Operations Center. 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0456.
20. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19-21, 1991, entry 0340 on January 19, 1991. MOPP level 0+ was a locally devised MOPP level for which there is no official definition. An entry made to the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 Command Post log indicates that MOPP level 0+ involved the M17A1 protective mask and a poncho.
21. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, January 19, 1991, entries 0541 and 0545.
22. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log for January 19-21, 1991.
23. Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 66.
24. Shenon, Phil, "Many Veterans of the Gulf War Detail Illnesses From Chemicals," New York Times, December 20, 1996.
25. Lead Report 5290, Interview of NMCB-24 Air Detachment officer-in-charge, June 18, 1991, p. 2.
26. Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs With Respect To Export Administration, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War," May 25, 1994, p. 66.
27. Lead Report 3872, Interview of NMCB-40 medical corpsman, May 15, 1997, p. 2.
28. Lead Report 5570, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, July 25, 1997, p. 1.
29. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, 0430 entry.
30. The entry at 0430 hours may contain incorrect information. M9 paper can not discriminate among chemical warfare agents. M9 paper can detect the presence of blister agents and nerve agents in liquid form but it does not identify the specific agent that is present, i.e., it could not identify mustard. For a liquid agent, M8 paper or the M256 kit may determine the type of agent. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC), October 1995, p. 417-420. Copies of the Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook may be purchased from the CBIAC. To order, please contact the CBIAC Administrator, via phone (410-676-9030), fax (410-676-9703), e-mail (cbiac@battelle.org), or use the interactive request form on the CBIAC web site www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil (as of June 25, 1999).
31. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, entries 0430, 0440, 0510, 0615, and 0748.
32. Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.
33. Lead Sheet 12190, Interview of a Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, July 1, 1997, p. 1, 2.
34. Shenon, Phil, "Many Veterans of the Gulf War Detail Illnesses From Chemicals," New York Times, December 20, 1996.
35. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Medical Admin Log, January 20-22, 1991; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, January 19-20, 1991; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Sick Call Log, January 19-23, 1991.
36. Lead Report 1151, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, Nov 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 11034, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, May 27, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 11189, interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 12051, interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 17, 1997, p. 1.
37. Lead Report 24978, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1
38. Lead Report 1097, Interview of NMCB-24 NBC noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 2.
39. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log, January 19, 1991, entry 0330.
40. General Support Group 1, 1st Force Service Support Group, Deputy Commander, Critical Facility Force, "Command Chronology for January 1991," p. 6.
41. I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991, entries at 0407, 0425, and 0525 hours, p. 94-95.
42. Logistics Operations Center, Daily Update Log, January 19, 1991 entry 0800.
43. Lead Report 5187, Interview of a Marine colonel, June 3, 1997, p. 2.
44. US Space Command, "United States Space Command Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Assessment (U)" (SECRET/NF), January 1992, p. 74-76.
45. US Air Force Central Command, "Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield Air Tasking Order (U)," (SECRET).
46. The speed of sound is approximately 750 miles per hour at sea level. At higher altitudes, the speed of sound is less than 750 miles per hour but factors such as the air temperature at the higher altitude determine the actual speed of sound. US Air Force, Fact Sheet 96-03, Subject: "Sonic Boom," web site www.af.mil/news/factsheets/Sonic_Boom.html (as of August 5, 2000).
47. 552d Computer Group Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," undated.
48. US Air Force Environmental Technical Applications Center, Technical Note USAFETAC/TN 92/003, Subject: "Gulf War Weather," March 1992, p. 3-7.
49. The formula F=1.8(C)+32 is used to convert degrees Celsius to degrees Fahrenheit while the formula C=(f-32)/1.8 converts degrees Fahrenheit to degrees Celsius. The Weather World 2010 Project, web site ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/guides/maps/ctof.rxml (as of August 23, 2000).
50. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 113, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
51. Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," July 28, 2000.
52. US Air Force, Air Force Research Laboratory, Letter, Subject: "Al Jubayl Sonic Boom Analysis," September 11, 2000.
53. Although Air Force Research Laboratory used an F-16 as the subject of their analysis, any aircraft type capable of supersonic flight would produce the similar results. Lead Report 27735, E-mail from US Air Force's Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, September 18, 2000.
54. A Styx missile is a Russian-made surface-to-surface missile used primarily as an anti-ship weapon. Slade, Stuart, "Russian Anti-Ship Missile Designations," June 5, 1999, web site www.warships1.com/Weapons/WMRUS_ASHmis.htm (as of August 5, 2000).
55. "Dusty mustard" is not a new class of chemical warfare agent. Rather, it refers to a method of dispersing a chemical warfare agent absorbed onto a carrier (dust) and then dispersing it as an aerosol. In this narrative, the chemical warfare agent under discussion is mustard, hence the name "dusty mustard." US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. 1.
56. OSA fast patrol boats are Russian-made naval vessels used for coastal patrol and defense. Jane's Fighting Ships, 95th ed., Jane's Information Group Limited, 1992, p. 529.
57. Final Report to Congress, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," April 1992, p. 13.
58. There is no evidence that indicates Iraq mated chemical warheads to Styx missiles. However, before the outbreak of hostilities, the Department of Defense Joint Staff reported that Iraq could manufacture a chemical warhead for the Styx missile. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "NADA INTSUM 341-90/DIA WASH DC," 211859Z Aug 90.
59. 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, entry 0205 on January 19, 1991.
60. US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. iii, 14.
61. Central Intelligence Agency, E-mail message, Subject: "Questions Related to Al Jubayl," July 21, 2000, @ 5:05 PM.
62. Roberts, Timothy, "Investigation of Gulf War 'Loud Noise' Incident," Center for Naval Analyses, November 1988, p. 2, 3. The Center for Naval Analyses is a federally funded research and development center that supports the Department of the Navy.
63. Joint Staff, Message, Subject: "NADA INTSUM 341-90/DIA WASH DC," 211859Z Aug 90.
64. 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Station Log, January 18-19, 1991. Unless indicated otherwise, information in this section is taken from the Rear Area Operations Center Radio log. A copy of the Rear Area Operations Center Radio Log is at Tab H.
65. Presumably, A6B was the call sign for an unidentified unit in the port area during the war.
66. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, entries at 0440, 0518, and 0748 hours.
67. Lead Report 6233, Interview of a Marine warrant officer, October 1, 1997.
68. Lead Report 6290, Interview of a Marine captain, October 2,1997.
69. US Marine Corps, "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm," Washington, DC, 1993, p. 41.
70. Lead Report 15201, Interview of a Marine colonel, February 26, 1998.
71. Lead Report 15448, Interview of a Navy admiral, March 12, 1997.
72. Lead Report 15602, Interview of a Marine general, March 26, 1998.
73. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entries 0338 and 0345 on January 19, 1991.
74. Lead Report 24977, Interview of an NMCB-24 NBC officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.
75. I Marine Expeditionary Force, G-3 journal, January 19, 1991, p. 94, 95.
76. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, p. 1, 2.
77. US Central Command, Staff Journal, January 19, 1991.
78. 1st Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Group, Significant Events Report, February 21, 1991, p. 2.
79. Lead Report 1151, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, Nov 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, January 24, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 11034, interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, May 27, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 11189, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 12051, interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 17, 1997, p. 1.
80. Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 11202, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 11191, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 24975, Affidavit from an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p.1; Lead Report 24976, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2; Lead Report 24978, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2; Lead Report 24979, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.
81. Lead Report 982, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1.
82. Lead Report 1173, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1207 Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 11191, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, June 4, 1997, p. 2; Lead Report 24976, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 2.
83. Lead Report 24979, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 5, 1999, p. 1.
84. Lead Report 982, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, September 27, 1996, p. 1.
85. We have uncovered no record of anyone in the Al Jubayl area dying or becoming incapacitated as a result of an exposure to a chemical warfare agent during Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm, nor has anyone alleged to our investigators that someone died or became incapacitated as a result of an exposure to a chemical warfare agent during the war.
86. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), August 13, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/ (as of August 5, 2000).
87. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 204.
88. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 219.
89. Siedell, Frederick, R., "Nerve Agents," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 142, 143, 144, 145.
90. Baskin, Steven J., and Thomas G. Brewer, "Cyanide Poisoning," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 276, 277, 278.
91. After examining postwar Iraqi declarations, UNSCOM inspection data, and other information, the Central Intelligence Agency compiled a list of the chemical warfare agents included in Iraq's Gulf War chemical warfare agent arsenal; lewisite is not on that list. Lead Sheet 25641, Interview of Central Intelligence Agency analyst, December 1, 1999, p. 1.
92. United Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume IX, "The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996," Document 189, "Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM," United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 1996, p. 656-657; Lead Sheet 25196, Interview of CIA expert on Iraqi chemical warfare, October 8, 1999, p. 1.
93. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 201, 202.
94. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 218, 219.
95. The effective dose for liquid mustard on the eye has not been reliably established. Eyes are the most sensitive organ to mustard and the most severe eye injuries are produced by liquid mustard. It follows, therefore, that an amount that is less than the effective dose for liquid mustard on the skin would cause an effect on the eye. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 201, 208, 210.
96. Although the liquid form of mustard would certainly irritate or damage a person's airway, liquids are not normally inhaled. If one were to inhale liquid blister agent, an amount that is less than the effective dose for the particular liquid agent on the skin would cause an effect on the airway. The severity of the effect is dependent upon the dose received. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 211.
97. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 1, p. 39.
98. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31, 32.
99. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 39.
100. National Safety Council Environmental Health Center, "Ammonia (NH3) Chemical Backgrounder," July 1, 1997, web site www.nsc.org/ehc/ew/chems/ammonia.htm
101. Roberts, Timothy, "Investigation of Gulf War 'Loud Noise' Incident," Center for Naval Analyses, November 1988, p. 12.
102. During the September 5, 1997, meeting, the two individuals presented a table from an unidentified document as proof that Coalition aircraft shot down the Iraqi Mirages. The table also shows that Iraq lost two MiG-25s and two MiG-29s to Coalition aircraft. The table is titled "Table VI-8, Operation Desert Storm Air-to-Air Victories by Coalition Air Forces, 17 January to 28 February."
103. The AWACS is an airborne system that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications to commanders of US and NATO air defense forces. US Air Force, Air Combat Command Public Affairs Office, Fact Sheet, "E-3 Sentry (AWACS)," March 1996, www.af.mil/news/factsheets/E_3_Sentry_AWACS.html (as of August 5, 2000).
104. US Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, "Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Special Operations" 1993, p. 320.
105. US Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, "Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Special Operations" 1993, p. 323.
106. Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," December 15, 1997.
107. 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," undated.
108. 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," undated.
109. US Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Special Programs Office, Letter from the Deputy Director, Subject: "Information on Iraqi A/C Shootdowns 19 Jan 91," September 22, 1997.
110. Lead Sheet 12190, Interview of Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, July 1, 1997, p.1, 2
111. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraphs 41, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
112. Lead Report 55, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 983, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, September 27, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1176, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 17, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1099, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, October 24, 1996, p. 1; Lead Report 1180, Interview of an NMCB-24 noncommissioned officer, December 18, 1996, p. 1.
113. For additional information on Scud missiles see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles " (Information Paper), July 25, 2000, (as of July 27, 2000).
114. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entries 2150 through 2230, January 20, 1991.
115. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 0046, January 21, 1991.
116. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entry 0054, January 21, 1991.
117. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 0115, January 21, 1991.
118. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Security Log, entry 0142, January 21, 1991.
119. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Air Detachment), Operations Log, entry 2200, January 20, 1991, and entries 2445 [0045], 0330, and 2150, January 21, 1991.
120. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 20-21, 1991.
121. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraphs 1, 38, 40, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
122. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,"A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraphs 47, 53, 58, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
123. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 41, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
124. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 57, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
125. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 25, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
126. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 139, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
127. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,  "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraphs 109-115, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
128. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 32, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
129. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 139, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
130. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "M256 Series Chemical Agent Detector Kit" (Information Paper), August 13, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/m256/ (as of August 5, 2000).
131. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraphs 67-73, 102, 103 and 106, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
132. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, entry 0748, January 19, 1991.
133. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, entry 0440, January 19, 1991.
134. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 109, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
135. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 111, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
136. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 113, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
137. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 114, web site http://www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
138. British Liaison Officer (Gulf Health), Letter, July 9, 1998
139. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A review of the Alleged Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl on 19 January 1991," January 17, 2000, paragraph 32, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
140. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 128, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
141. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 130, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
142. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,"A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, paragraph 132, web site www.gulfwar.mod.uk/info/jubayl.htm (as of July 13, 2000).
143. US Central Command, NBC Desk Log, January 19, 1991, p. 1, 2.
144. Deputy Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Letter, Subject: "Request for Assistance," July 21, 1998.
145. 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," December 1998.
146. 552d Air Control Wing, Letter from the Commander, Subject: "Report on Investigation of AWACS Tapes from 19 January 1991," December 1998.
147. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles," (Information Paper), July 25, 2000, p. 14-15, web site www.gulflink.health.mil (as of July 25, 2000).
148. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.
149. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 11.
150. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.
151. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 18.
152. Lead Report 1410, Interview of Port Security Unit-301A engineering officer, March 7, 1997, p. 2.
153. Although possibly missile fuel, we do not know the source of the fumes. Iraq used kerosene as the fuel for its Scuds and Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) as the oxidizer. Exposure to even small amounts of IRFNA can cause severe and life threatening injuries. Unlike IRFNA, kerosene is a common substance used in diesel fuels and aircraft fuel. An exposure to kerosene should not pose a serious health risk. To date, we have found no records indicating that any personnel who responded to the impact site or participated in the Scud recovery operation sought medical attention for injuries associated with exposure to either substance. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Nitric Acid Fact Sheet, web site www.hhmi.org/science/labsafe/lcss/lcss62.html (as of August 5, 2000); Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA)" (Information Paper), August 13, 1999, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/irfna (as of August 5, 2000); Mattie, David R., PhD, "Toxicity of Rocket Fuels: Comparison of Hydrogen Peroxide with Current Propellants," 1st Hydrogen Peroxide Propulsion Workshop, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK, .July 29-31, 1988, web site www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/SSC/H2O2CONF/dmattie.htm ( as of October 16, 2000).
154. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996, (SECRET), p. 18.
155. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," August 1996, (SECRET), p. 18.
156. Lead Report 1232, Interview of Navy warrant officer, January 10, 1997, p.2
157. Lead Report 1257, Interview of an Army captain, January 21, 1997, p. 2.
158. Defense Intelligence Agency, Letter, Subject: "Declassification of Sentence," August 11, 1997.
159. Photograph provided by a member of US Cost Guard's Port Security Unit 301.
160. Photograph provided by a member of US Cost Guard's Port Security Unit 301.
161. The M18A2 Chemical Agent Detection Kit is used to detect dangerous concentrations of chemical warfare agents whether they are in vapor, aerosol, or liquid form. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 421-424.
162. Lead Report 1232, Interview of Navy warrant officer, January 10, 1997, p. 2.
163. Center for Naval Analyses, "Case Study of a Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) Attack: Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 15-16 February 1991 (U)," (SECRET), August 1996, p. 1.
164. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 1445 on March 19, 1991.
165. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 1.
166. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Medical Administrative Log, March 19, 1991, entry 1445.
167. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, March 19, 1991.
168. Lead Report 1181, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 18, 1996, p. 2.
169. Lead Report 1282, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, February 7, 1997, p. 1.
170. Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1.
171. It is possible that more people could have experienced or been exposed to the same substance as the nine Seabees discussed in this narrative. During an interview, one NMCB-24 medical corpsman said that "14-15 persons presented with purple t-shirts on the windward side of clothing and boots." However, the NMCB-24 sick call log shows that only seven persons reported to the medical section for treatment. Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2, and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 (Camp 13), Sick Call Log, March 19, 1991.
172. Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, Command Post Log, entry 1445 on March 19, 1991.
173. Lead Report 1181, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, December 18, 1996, p. 1.
174. Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2.
175. Lead Report 1400, Interview of NMCB-24 senior noncommissioned officer, February 27, 1997, p. 2.
176. Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2; Lead Report 1261, Interview of an NMCB-24 Seabee, January 24, 1997, p. 1; Lead Report 1400, Interview of NMCB-24 senior non-commissioned officer, February 27, 1997, p. 2.
177. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia, November 29, 1990.
178. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 4, 10, and Enclosure 1.
179. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 10.
180. Lead Report 632, Interview of NMCB-24 medical corpsman, March 19, 1996, p. 2.
181. Other than the source document identified in the following footnote, investigators have not found any other information regarding tests conducted on T-shirts by the US Army's material Test Directorate. Investigators did attempt to obtain additional information from the test directorate. Unfortunately, the directorate had undergone reorganization in the intervening period between the T-shirt test and the commencement of DoD's investigation of the Purple T-shirt incident. We have been unable to locate any current or former test directorate employee that could provide us with any additional information on the tests. It is included in this discussion of the purple T-shirt incident to inform the reader that post-war testing was conducted in an attempt to identify what may have caused the T-shirts to change color. In addition, investigators have found no information during the investigation to suggest that testing of combat boots was ever conducted.
182. US Army White Sands Missile Range, Material Test Directorate, Letter, July 20, 1993.
183. Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center, Memorandum to the US Army Aviation and Troop Command, Subject: "Color Changes of T-Shirts Worn During Operation Desert Shield/Storm," May 17, 1994.
184. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 3.
185. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5.
186. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.
187. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.
188. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990.
189. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5, 6, 7, 8; and Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990. The numbers in parentheses next to company names correspond with the industries shown in Figure 21.
190. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.
191. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.
192. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 3, 4.
193. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 5.
194. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990.
195. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area, Appendix B - Wind Behavior in Eastern Saudi Arabia," November 29, 1990.
196. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995.
197. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 2-4.
198. Center for Naval Analyses, Report for the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Subject: "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area," November 29, 1990; and Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995.[199] Berg SW, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, "Post Persian Gulf Medical Findings in Military Reservists," Report presented to National Institute of Health Technology Assessment Conference on the Persian Gulf Experience and Health, Bethesda, Maryland, April 1994, and to the Institute of Medicine Committee to Review the Consequences of Service during the Gulf War. The report is reviewed in the report of the Institute of Medicine, "Health Consequences of Service during the Gulf War: Initial Findings and Recommendations for Immediate Action," National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1995.
199. Haley, R.W., T.L. Kurt, J. Horn, "Is there a Gulf War Syndrome? Searching for Syndromes by Factor Analysis of Symptoms," The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1977, 277:215-22.
200. Haley, R.W., J. Horn, P.S. Roland, et al., "Evaluation of Neurologic Function in Gulf War veterans; a blinded case control study, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1997; 277:223-30.
201. Haley, R.W., T.L. Kurt, "Self-reported Exposure to Neurotoxic Chemical Combination in the Gulf War; a
202. Haley, R.W., S. Billecke, B.N.La Du., "Association of Low Pon1 Type Q (Type A) Arylesterase Activity with Neurologic Symptom Complexes in Gulf War Veterans," Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, 1999;57:227-33.
203. Roland, P.S., R.W. Haley, W. Yellin, K. Owens, A.G. Shoup, "Vestibular dysfunction in Gulf War syndrome," Otolaryngol Head Neck Surgery, 2000;122:319-29.
204. Gray, G.C., K.S. Kaiser, A.A.W. Hawksworth, F.W. Hall, E. Barrett-Connor, "Increased Postwar Symptoms And Psychological Morbidity Among US Navy Gulf War Veterans," American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1999;60:75-766
205. Gray, G.C., K.S. Kaiser, A.W. Hawksworth, H.L. Watson, "No Serologic Evidence Of An Association Found Between Gulf War Service And Mycoplasma Fermentans Infection," American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1999, 60:752-7
206. Gray, G.C., Personal communication, Subject: "Seabee Health Study: Comparison of NMCB24 and NMCB40, G[ulf] W[ar] V[eterans] only, February 1999," January 17, 2000.
207. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 26.
208. Siedell, Frederick, R., John S. Urbanetti, William J. Smith, and Charles G. Hurst, "Vesicants," "Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare," eds. Frederick R. Sidell, COL Ernest T. Takafuji, and COL David R. Franz, "Part I, Warfare, Weapons, and the Casualty," Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, eds. BG Russ Zajtchuk and COL Ronald F. Bellamy, Office of the Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 198, 199, 204, 218, 220, web site www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/HomePage/WhatsNew/MedAspects/contents.html (as of August 5, 2000).
209. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II, Definitions And Terms," December 22, 1995, website www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of September 1, 2000).
210. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II. Definitions And Terms," December 22, 1995, website www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of September 1, 2000).
211. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 27.
212. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997, website www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/ (as of September 1, 2000).
213. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 3, p. 58.
214. [US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 46.
215. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Technical Secretariat, "Detection of Chemical Weapons: An overview of methods for the detection of chemical warfare agents;" April 29, 1997, www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/detect.htm.
216. US Army Intelligence Agency, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Report AST-2660Z-055-88, Subject: "Dusty Agents: Implications for Chemical Warfare Protection," January 27, 1988, p. 1, 2, 3.
217. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 265
218. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 271.
219. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 295.
220. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 299.
221. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 18.
222. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 19.
223. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 21.
224. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
225. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, p. 30.
226. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 31.
227. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 417.
228. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 39.
229. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 544.
230. Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) And Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), November 13, 1997, web site www.gulflink.health.mil/mopp/ (as of August 5, 2000).
231. Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, "Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook," Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October 1995, p. 430.
232. US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication P-5041, US Air Force Joint Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11, "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties And Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Glossary, Section II. Definitions And Terms," December 22, 1995, web site http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/MedRef/OnlineRef/FieldManuals/fm8_285/PART_I/index.htm (as of August 5, 2000).
233. Jane's Fighting Ships, 95th ed., Jane's Information Group Limited, 1992, p. 529.
234. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 766.
235. Trinity University, Marrs McLean Science Center web site www.geos.trinity.edu/ece/air_pollution/thermal_inversion.htm (as of October 17, 2000).
236. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Washington, DC, web site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/u/06630 (as of October 10, 2000).
237. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p 23-25.
238. Williams and Wilkins, Stedmans Concise Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions, 3rd ed., ed. John H. Dirckx, MD, Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, MD, 1997, p. 944.
239. Harrison's Principles Of Internal Medicine, 14th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998, p. 104-105.
240. US Army Field Manual 3-9, US Navy Publication P-467, US Air Force Manual 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," December 12, 1990, chapter 2, p. 23.
241. Based on locations reported for battalion-level Unit Identification Codes derived from the Geographic Information System; Unit Identification Code-based personnel strengths from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
242. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This chemical weapons convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 states and ratified or acceded to by 106 states as of February 1998. It was signed by the United States on January 13, 1993, and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army Field Manual 3-4, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-9, "NBC Protection," May 1992; US Army Field Manual 8-285, US Navy Medical Publication 5041, US Air Force Manual 44-149, US Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 11-11 (adopted as NATO Field Manual 8-285), "Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries," December 22, 1995; US Army Field Manual 19-20, "Law Enforcement Investigations," November 25, 1985; and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for developing this methodology.
243. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm", January 3, 1995, p. 8.
244. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8, 9.
245. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p. 8.
246. Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, Report by the officer in charge, Subject: "Report on Purple Tee Shirt Episode Among Seabees in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, During Operation Desert Storm," January 3, 1995, p.4, 10, and  Enclosure 1.
247. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "A Review of the Suggested Exposure of UK Forces to Chemical Warfare Agents in Al Jubayl During the Gulf Conflict," January 17, 2000, (as of July 13, 2000).
248. 24th Marines Rear Area Operations Center, Radio Log," January 18-19, 1991.
249. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 30, 31.
250. US General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Veterans Affairs, House of Representatives, Subject: "Gulf War Illnesses: Procedural and Reporting Improvements Are Needed in DOD's Investigative Processes," Report # NSIAD-99-59, February 1999, p. 35.