Immediately following the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. Army units occupied the area known as Objective GOLD and later identified as the Khamisiyah ASP (which was also known as Tall al Lahm or Suq Ash Shuyukh). Khamisiyah was a huge ammunition storage site, covering 50 square kilometers and containing about 100 ammunition bunkers and several other types of storage facilities. The XVIII Corps (Airborne) (ABN) dispatched combat engineer and demolition units to Khamisiyah to destroy its munitions and facilities.

To perform the demolition, U.S. forces set off two very large explosions, one on March 4, 1991 and a second on March 10, 1991. They also set off a number of smaller explosions to destroy small caches of munitions and to test techniques for destroying bunkers. Demolition operations continued in the Khamisiyah area through most of April 1991.

During the demolition operations, and, indeed, throughout the entire period of U.S. occupation at Khamisiyah, there were no reports of verified chemical agent detections, nor were there reports of anyone, soldier or civilian, experiencing symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent.

In October 1991 and March 1992, and then again in May 1996, the UNSCOM inspected Khamisiyah, specifically searching for chemical weapons. Based on their own inspections and information provided by the Iraqis, UNSCOM inspectors identified three sites in and around Khamisiyah that had contained chemical weapons: in an area that became known as the "pit;" in Bunker 73, one of the bunkers subsequently identified as having been blown up by U.S. troops; and in an above-ground storage area.

In October 1991, UNSCOM inspectors found about 300 damaged and intact 122mm rockets in an area surrounded by a berm southeast of the main ASP. This area became known as the "pit." Their investigation showed that the intact rockets contained chemical agents (sarin and cyclosarin). During a subsequent visit in March 1992, about 500 rockets were blown up on site near the "pit", with the remaining rockets being shipped to Al Muthanna, Iraq for subsequent destruction. The UNSCOM destruction efforts accounts for 782 rockets; the Iraqis report that 2,160 such rockets had been at Khamisiyah. It is unknown how many of the unaccounted for rockets were destroyed by U.S. forces.

During the 1991 inspection, the Iraqis claimed that chemical munitions found in the "pit" had been salvaged from Bunker 73 and that both had been destroyed by Coalition Forces. UNSCOM inspectors visited the site of the bunker, which appeared damaged, and used chemical agent monitors. These monitors were negative, and the inspectors did not thoroughly search the bunker.

The UNSCOM team was also shown an above-ground storage site about three kilometers west of the ASP containing 6,300 intact 155mm artillery shells filled with mustard agent. To date, there is no evidence that any Coalition Forces had been to this site. These rounds were also shipped to the destruction facility at Al Muthanna.

U.S. intelligence became aware of the UNSCOM findings in November 1991, but at the time this report did not result in identification of which, if any, U.S. troops participated in demolition activities at Khamisiyah. The lack of contemporaneous U.S. reports of chemical weapons, and the fact that the Iraqis were selective in their willingness to cooperate, as reported by UNSCOM to the United Nations Security Council, led to the belief the Iraqis were not telling the truth about chemical weapons being at the site when the demolition occurred. In May 1996, UNSCOM again returned to Khamisiyah, where the team conclusively identified debris in the rubble of Bunker 73 that was characteristic of chemical munitions.

In February 1994, a request from Congressman Browder to the UN for any reports about chemical weapons found in Iraq after the Gulf War rekindled U.S. interest in Khamisiyah. The UN responded with a letter in April 1994 which listed Khamisiyah along with other chemical weapons sites. During hearings on export administration in May 1994 before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, DOD witnesses admitted the UN had found chemical weapons at Khamisiyah but were unable to confirm that any U.S. troops were at the site.

In March 1995, as a result of Presidential concerns, the CIA began a reexamination of relevant intelligence. In May 1995, a Presidential Advisory Committee was created. In June 1995, DOD formed the Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team. Throughout 1995 and 1996, interest in Khamisiyah and the events surrounding it increased. On June 21, 1996, DOD confirmed publicly that "U.S. soldiers from the 37th Engineer Battalion destroyed ammunition bunkers at [Khamisiyah] in early March 1991 ... it now appears that one of these destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons."

DOD investigation into the subject continues. What follows provides additional detail about the events described in this summary. The information upon which this narrative is based is incomplete. As the investigation continues, the IAD hopes to answer a number of these questions, including the following:

• How many chemical warfare munitions were present at Bunker 73 and at the "pit" at the time the U.S. demolitions took place?
• Were two separate groups working in the "pit" on March 10, 1991?
• Was there an additional demolition of munitions at the "pit" on March 12, 1991?
• Who were the 15 to 20 engineers assigned to assist the EOD noncommissioned officer in the "pit" on March 10 or 12, 1991?
• What were the weather conditions on the day(s) of the "pit" demolition(s)?

The Khamisiyah ASP, also known to Coalition Forces as Tall al Lahm, Suq Ash Shuyukh (local Iraqi place names), or Objective GOLD [1], was a large munitions storage depot. It is located in southern Iraq along the southern side of the Euphrates River and about 25 kilometers southeast of the city of An Nasiriyah. The ASP area borders a major highway [2] used extensively by U.S. troops transiting the area after the cease-fire began. Khamisiyah was an extensive complex of above- and below-ground ammunition bunkers, general storage buildings, and open equipment storage revetments (sand mounds, or berms) covering approximately 50 square kilometers. The main site covered 25 square kilometers. Figure 1 shows the location of Khamisiyah in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.

Beginning in late 1995, both the U.S. Intelligence Community and DOD's Persian Gulf Illness Investigation Team began a thorough review of Iraqi chemical capabilities during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield and the demolition of munitions at the Khamisiyah ASP. These investigations eventually led DOD to announce that "it now appears that one of these destroyed bunkers contained chemical weapons."[3] The following details what is currently known of the events at Khamisiyah ASP involving U.S. troops:

At the opening of the Gulf War (January 1991), the U.S. Central Command did not classify Khamisiyah as a chemical weapons storage site [4]. However, by late February 1991, the XVIII Corps (ABN) G-3 indicated that Khamisiyah was suspected of being a chemical weapons storage site [5].

During the Air War of Operation Desert Storm (Jan. 16 - March 1, 1991), Coalition Force aircraft attacked Khamisiyah [6], destroying scores of warehouses and several ammunition bunkers [7]. At the commencement of the Ground War (Feb. 24, 1991), it was widely believed that U.S. Forces operating in the KTO after G-Day were likely to capture chemical warfare and, possibly, biological warfare munitions of various types [8]. Accordingly, all command levels issued Commander's Guidance for Disposition of Captured Chemical and Biological Munitions and other directives for dealing with captured Iraqi CW or BW munitions (see USCINCCENT on Feb. 24, 1991 [9], COMUSARCENT on Feb. 21, 1991 [10], and XVIII Corps (ABN) on Feb. 27, 1991 [11]).

For example, the Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) [12]), also issued a memorandum on Feb. 16, 1991 detailing the guidance for handling these items. The handling/disposition of CW or BW munitions guidance documents emphasized safety and security for both Coalition Forces and the local population:

Destruction of munitions or bulk agent will be accomplished in accordance with established EOD field disposal policies and procedures to ensure the complete and safe destruction of the captured items. Prior to destruction, all necessary measures to preclude collateral damage or down-wind hazard to friendly forces and civilians will be accomplished [13].

In April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, setting specific terms for a formal cease-fire to end the conflict between Iraq, Kuwait and the countries cooperating with Kuwait [68]. In May 1991, in response to UN Security Council Resolution 687, the Iraqis declared to UNSCOM that "Khamisiyah (Nasiriyah)" was a chemical weapons storage site, although it was not included in their first declaration to the UN in April 1991. This was confusing information because it referred to two locations, a known site (Nasiriyah), and an as yet unknown site (Khamisiyah).

In October 1991, UNSCOM sent a team to inspect six of the sites which were not near Baghdad. The site map provided to the UNSCOM Team was labeled "An Nasiriyah Depot S.W. (Khamisiyah)," and it depicted the layout of what U.S. Intelligence knew as An Nasiriyah ASP. However, the UNSCOM Team was not taken to An Nasiriyah, but to a different site, which is now known to be Khamisiyah. They were shown artillery shells and rockets in two separate areas apart from the main ASP (see Figure 2). An open area, 3 kilometers west of the bunkers, contained 6,323 155mm artillery shells filled with mustard agent. These shells were undamaged and were stored in an orderly fashion (in several stacks/clusters) under tarpaulins, using the natural terrain features to hide them. The second area, located in a "pit" south of the main bunker complex, contained 297 122mm rockets in three to four "heaps," some of which were damaged but most were intact. Some rockets were neatly laid out, while others appeared to have been bulldozed into piles or heaps. Many rockets were leaking, and plastic inserts and other features characteristic of chemical munitions were observed, so UNSCOM personnel drilled into one of the intact rockets to take a sample. The sample was later analyzed and found to be a chemical warfare nerve agent (sarin/cyclosarin).

The Iraqis told UNSCOM in 1991 that chemical rockets found in the "pit" had been salvaged from Bunker 73, which had been destroyed as part of the demolition operations by Coalition Forces. UNSCOM acknowledged that Bunker 73 appeared damaged, but did not thoroughly inspect the bunker. Chemical agent monitoring at the bunker site was negative. No other observations were documented concerning remains of munitions, such as whether there were observable plastic inserts or other paraphernalia characteristic of chemical munitions.

In November 1991, the U.S. Intelligence Community became aware of the results of the UNSCOM Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Facility site visit [69]. The U.S. Intelligence Community did not believe Iraqi accounts to the UN that chemical weapons had been blown up at Khamisiyah by the coalition forces at the end of the war [70]. They believed the Iraqis were engaged in possible deception, consistent with the observations of UNSCOM in their inspections and analysis of Iraqi declarations [71].

Despite their doubts, intelligence analysts initiated a search for any U.S. units involved in blowing up munitions at Khamisiyah. A response to their request dated Nov. 12, 1991 indicates that they had "received information from ARCENT [the Army Central Command] to the fact that 24th Mechanized Infantry Division was located in the vicinity of Tall al Lahm, but [were] unable to confirm if U.S. troops did in fact destroy buildings at this particular site." [72] ARCENT mistakenly identified the 24th Infantry Division as being in the area at the time, although they had not carried out the demolition at Khamisiyah. The ARCENT lead was followed, and a Nov. 20, 1991 message notes that "Info on Tall al Lahm Ammo Depot was passed to ... G-2 Office, Ft. Stewart, GA," Headquarters of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division. Further, this message states "info on presence of troops there and their activities during Desert Storm were requested...." [73] The IAD has followed that lead; after more than five years, the person contacted at Fort Stewart has no specific recollection of being contacted or of any specific subsequent actions taken. Additional follow-up has provided no further leads at this point [74].

During a March 1992 visit, the UNSCOM Team consolidated and destroyed at least 500 122mm rockets. According to the UNSCOM press release [75].

On March 30,1992, the munitions destroyed included full, partially full, and empty rockets. This number includes the 297 rockets mentioned previously, which were found in the "pit". In addition to the rockets destroyed in the March 1992 site visit, more than 200 [76].

Rockets were unearthed by the Iraqis in the "pit" and shipped to Al Muthanna for destruction. More than 700 rockets or major rocket parts in all were found in the "pit" area. The actual number of rockets in the "pit" and Bunker 73 is unknown, and continues to be topic of questioning during interviews with 1-800 callers and other interviewees.

The CIA was charged by the PAC [92] to develop predictions of the potential chemical fallout from the March 1991 demolition operations using, among other models, the U.S. Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Command's NUSSE4 transport and diffusion model. The results were briefed to the PAC on July 9, 1996, and on Aug. 2, 1996, the CIA published a report on the Bunker 73 explosion on March 4,1991. They concluded that the likely movement of vapor was to the east and northeast away from U.S. troops [93].

With regard to the "pit " explosion, the CIA encountered numerous modelling uncertainties, especially weather data, and could not come to any definitive conclusions. On Oct. 29, 1996, DOD asked IDA to convene an independent panel of experts in meteorology, physics, chemistry, and related disciplines to review all of the modelling efforts available in order to determine the potential fallout from the "pit" area demolition. IDA provided a progress report on Dec. 18, 1996. At that time, IDA reported:

.... continued concern about the inability to describe the many variables of the agent-munition release mechanism. The panel agrees with the CIA that "huge uncertainties remain" in the number of rockets present for destruction and the number of those rockets destroyed. Among the other major variables for which there remains much uncertainty are total quantity of agent released, mechanism of release, and purity of agent [94].

The expert panel is working with DOD investigators and was briefed by CIA analysts in order to assess the model inputs and to determine whether the original dispersion and weather models (or any other models) may be effective in predicting the possible extent of chemical exposure as a result of the Khamisiyah demolitions.

On Aug. 7, 1996, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs designed and conducted a telephone outreach to veterans who may have participated in the operation at Khamisiyah ASP. Based on a search of the ESG database and over 100 interviews, the PGIIT was able to determine units potentially involved in this operation. Individuals were selected for the telephone outreach based on their Gulf War assignment to one of these units.

DMDC identified 1,179 individuals assigned to units thought to have participated in the operation. Of those identified, 542 individuals were contacted and completed the survey, 14 were uncooperative with telephone operators, and 12 individuals are deceased. The telephone outreach effort concluded in October 1996. All individuals who were not able to be contacted via the telephone were mailed a certified letter, informing them of the incident and requesting they share any information pertaining to the incident through the 1-800 hotline. 259 individuals received the certified letter but did not contact DMDC, and 352 individuals have yet to receive a letter because either it is in the process of being forwarded to them or they have no known address.

The personal descriptions of the incident offered by each individual completing the survey were analyzed to screen for potential leads for the continuing investigation. The PGIIT used the data as a basis for follow-up interviews. Of the total 542 contacted, 39 individuals mentioned chemical alarms sounding during this period. These 39 reports, and all subsequent reports of chemical alarms sounding, are the subject of continuing examination and further analysis by the investigators of the IAD, the successor organization to PGIIT.

Given the uncertainty concerning the fallout from the "pit" demolition on March 10, 1991 and after careful review of the CIA's preliminary results, DOD decided to be conservative and notify all those who were thought to be within a 50 kilometer radius of Khamisiyah ASP between March 1 and 15, 1991. Letters were sent to approximately 21,000 Gulf War veterans. The intent of these letters was to inform them of the incident; to inform them of the potential for low-level exposure to chemical warfare agent; to explain how to sign up for examination in the DOD or Department of Veterans Affairs registries; and to notify them of a forthcoming survey to query for specific unit/individual location information, chemical exposure data, and health and medical program participation questions. The most important part of the letter was:

We need to hear from you, not only about your experience in the vicinity of the site, but also about any health problems you think may be a result of your service during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Your timely response to the survey will provide us with critical information. If you have information that you believe would be of immediate value to us pertaining to the events at Khamisiyah, please call the PERSIAN GULF INCIDENT HOTLINE at 1-800-472-6719.

If you are experiencing health problems you believe to be a result of your service in Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield and you are eligible for health benefits through the Department of Defense, please call the COMPREHENSIVE CLINICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM at 1-800-796-9699. If you are eligible for benefits provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs system, please call the PERSIAN GULF HELPLINE at 1-800-PGW-VETS [95]. Mailing of the survey started 10 January 1997 and is still continuing [96].

This case is still being investigated. As additional information becomes available, it will be incorporated. If you have records, photographs, recollections, or find errors in the details reported, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719

1SG First Sergeant

AASLT Air Assault

ABN Airborne (type of unit)

ACR Armored Calvary Regiment (Army unit)

ADA Air Defense Artillery

AMB Ambulance

AO Area of Operation

ARCENT Army Central Command

ASP Ammunition Storage Point

ATC Air Traffic Control

AVN Aviation

Bde Brigade (Army unit)

BDO Battle Dress Overgarment

Bn Battalion (Army unit)

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

Cbt Combat

CCEP Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program

CENTCOM Central Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

Co Company (Army unit)

COMUSARCENT Commander, U.S. Army Central Command

COSCOM Corps Support Command

CSG Corps Support Group

CSM Command Sergeant Major

CTOC Corps Tactical Operations Center

DECON Decontamination

Det Detachment

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISCOM Division Support Command

Div Division

DIVARTY Divisional Artillery

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense (U.S.)

DVA Department of Veterans Affairs

EN Engineer (Unit designation)

ENSITREP Engineer Situation Report

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESG Environmental Support Group

FA Field Artillery (Unit desgination)

FRAGO Fragmentary Order

Fwd Forward

GA Georgia

GB Nerve agent (sarin)

GF Nerve agent (cyclosarin)

GWAPS Gulf Air War Planning Staff

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Hqs Headquarters

HTML Hyper-Text Media Link

IAD Investigation and Analysis Directorate

IN Infantry (Unit designation)

KTO Kuwaiti Theater of Operations 

Maint Maintenance

MECH Mechanized

mm millimeter

MMC Material Management Center

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MSR Military Supply Route

MTF Military Treatment Facility 

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NCOIC NCO In Charge

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NW northwest

OBJ Objective

OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)

PGIIT Persian Gulf Illnesses Investigation Team

POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant

QM Quartermaster

RMC Regional Medical Center

S&S Supple and Service 

SE southeast

SITREP Situation Report

Spt Support

Sqdn Squadron (Army unit)

SW southwest

TAC Tactical

TF Task Force

TOC Tactical Operations Center

U.S. United States

UIC Unit Identification Code

UN United Nations

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

USCINCCENT Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

UXO Unexploded Ordnance 

CCEP

Developed by a multi-disciplinary team of DOD and VA medical specialists, the CCEP provides a two-phase, comprehensive medical evaluation. Phase I is conducted at the local military hospital or clinic and consists of a history and medical examination comparable in scope and thoroughness to an in-patient hospital admissions evaluation. The medical review includes questions about family history, health, occupation, unique exposures in the Gulf War, and a structured review of symptoms.

Health care providers specifically inquire about the symptoms and Persian Gulf exposures listed on the CCEP Provider-Administered Patient Questionnaire. The medical examination focuses on patients' symptoms and health concerns and includes standard laboratory tests (complete blood count, urinalysis, serum chemistries) and other tests as clinically indicated.

Individuals who require additional evaluation after completing the Phase I evaluation and appropriate consultations may be referred to one of 14 Regional Medical Centers for Phase II evaluations. RMCs are tertiary care medical centers that have representation from most major medical disciplines. Phase II evaluations consist of symptom-specific examinations, additional laboratory tests, and specialty consultations according to the prescribed protocol.

Cyclosarin

A nerve gas agent commonly referred to as GF, similar to sarin (GB) (see below), but more persistent.

Detection Paper

Detection paper is based on certain dyes being soluble in chemical warfare agents. Normally, two dyes and one pH indicator are used, which are mixed with cellulose fibers in a paper without special coloring (unbleached). When a drop of chemical warfare agent is absorbed by the paper, it dissolves one of the pigments. Mustard agent dissolves a red dye and nerve agent a yellow. In addition, VX causes the indicator to turn to blue which, together with the yellow, will become green/green-black.

Detection paper can thus be used to distinguish between three different types of chemical warfare agents. A disadvantage with the papers is that many other substances can also dissolve the pigments. Consequently, they should not be located in places where drops of, e.g., solvent, fat, oil or fuel can fall on them. Drops of water give no reaction.

On the basis of spot diameter and density on the detection paper, it is possible to obtain an opinion on the original size of the droplets and the degree of contamination. A droplet of 0.5 mm diameter gives a spot sized about 3 mm on the paper. A droplet/cm2 of this kind corresponds to a ground contamination of about 0.5 g/m2. The lower detection limit in favorable cases is 0.005 g/m2.

M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit

The M256A1 kit is a portable, expendable item capable of detecting and identifying hazardous concentrations of chemical agent. The M256 kit is used after a chemical attack to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. This improvement was accomplished by using an eel enzyme for the nerve test in the M256A1 kit in place of the horse enzyme used in the M256 kit.

M8A1 Chemical Alarm

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air by providing troops with both a audible and visible warning. The M8A1 was fielded to replace the wet chemical M8 detector with a dry system which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.

Mustard

Mustard "gas" refers to several manufactured chemicals including sulfur mustard. They do not occur naturally in the environment. The term gas is in quotes because mustard "gas" does not behave as a gas under ordinary conditions. Mustard "gas" is really a liquid and is not likely to change into a gas immediately if it is released at ordinary temperatures. As a pure liquid, it is colorless and odorless, but when mixed with other chemicals, it looks brown and has a garlic-like smell. Mustard "gas" was used in chemical warfare and was made in large amounts during World Wars I and II. It was reportedly used in the Iran-Iraq war in 1984-1988. It is not presently used in the United States, except for research purposes.

The only way that mustard "gas" would enter the environment [other than through use as a weapon] would be through an accidental release. Some evaporates from water and soil into air. It does not easily go into water, and the amount that does breaks down quickly. It is more stable in soil than in water but still breaks down within days, depending on the outside temperature (cold weather makes it more stable). It does not go from soil to groundwater. Mustard "gas" does not build up in the tissues of animals because it breaks down so quickly. Mustard "gas" makes your eyes burn, your eyelids swell, and causes you to blink a lot. If you breathe mustard "gas," it can cause coughing, bronchitis, and long-term respiratory disease.

Sarin

Sarin is a light brown liquid. It is odorless, and evaporates about as fast as gasoline. It is toxic both as fumes and to the touch. It is not as persistent an agent as Tabun or Soman, the other two of the trinity of nerve gases developed in Germany. Sarin, along with Tabun and Soman was invented not long before the Second World War by German scientist Dr. Gerhard Schrader. While developing insecticides similar to malathion and parathion, he discovered the first "nerve gas" agents, as they were then called. In 1936 he discovered Sarin. The Germans stockpiled these weapons during the Second World War, but never used them, probably because of Hitler's personal distaste for the weapons (he himself was a victim of gas attacks in Flanders during the First World War). Sarin is now known as "GB."

Only very small amounts of Sarin are needed to kill. A single milligram of Sarin coming in contact with the skin is sufficient to kill. In a vaporous form, it takes a concentration of 100 milligrams per cubic meter to be fatal. Nerve gases such as Sarin are known as "organophosphorus anticholinesterases" or "OP's." Their chemical method of killing is to block the enzyme cholinesterase. The body's muscles receive electrical impulses caused by choline. Cholinesterase break down choline, making sure these impulses stop at the proper time. Cholinesterase attaches itself to choline and breaks it down, thus halting the impulse. Sarin fools thecholinesterase into acting upon the Sarin as it would choline. When the cholinesterase attaches itself to Sarin, it doesn't break down. Thus, choline is not broken down, and the body goes into convulsions.

The first symptoms start in the eyes, where the pupils contract and vision is blurred. It causes breathing problems and chest tightness. Finally it produces vomiting and headaches, after which the heart and lungs stop as the body convulses. The antidote is a substitute for the missing cholinesterase, which is atropine.

The armed forces in the Gulf War were given Oxime tablets in case of gas attack, which acts to release cholinesterase from the Sarin.

UN Security Council Resolution 687

This resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991. The pertinent section of this resolution, as related to the Khamisiyah report, follows:

6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above [paragraph 6 is only numbered paragraph in document], the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within 45 days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within 45 days of such approval.

The following units have been identified to the IAD through contacts with commanding officers. The IAD is providing this information to a separate team whose focus is to verify unit locations :

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Division Support Command:

Division Troops:

If you are aware of units or individuals who were within the 50-kilometer radius of Khamisiyah who are not listed above, please contact the DOD Persian Gulf Task Force Hot Line at 1-800-472-6719.